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I. INTRODUCTION
Should choice of law norms ever designate non-state norms as
applicable law? The question is not new, of course, although it is seldom
discussed systematically. Twenty-five years ago, Perry Dane proposed
conceptualizing the relationship between the state and the church as a
conflict of laws instrument to deal with conflicts between law and religion.1
We might like to apply a similar analysis to conflicts between law and
culture, visible for example in the debate about a “cultural defense.”2 But
to do so, we would need a general theory; and such a theory is lacking.
Textbooks in the United States and in the United Kingdom usually define
conflict of laws as the field dealing with situations that have contacts with
more than one state. Choice of law is the choice of which state’s law
applies; non-state law is not discussed.3 In Europe, particularly in Germany,
some debate the applicability of a specific body of non-state norms, the new
lex mercatoria; 4 but usually no general discussion of non-state norms
ensues. Individual proposals rarely lead to general discussions. Choice of
law as a discipline has largely defined itself as choice between laws of
states. As a discipline, it considers issues regarding the applicability of nonstate normative orders as peripheral at best.
Yet the question of whether non-state norms can be the applicable law
1. Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing
Authorities, 90 YALE L. J. 350, 365-76 (1980); see Gregory A. Kalscheur, John Paul II, John
Courtney Murray, and the Relationship Between Civil Law and Moral Law: A Constructive
Proposal for Contemporary American Pluralism, 1 J. CATH . SOC. T HOUGHT 231 (2004). For
a recent analysis of the relationship from a position of religious pluralism, see Steven D.
Smith, The Pluralist Predicament: Contemporary Theorizing in the Law of Religious
Freedom, 10 LEGA L T H EORY 51 (2004). Notably, the normative pluralism these author
invoke excludes the state itself. The state can be neutral vis-à-vis the divergent religions
precisely because it stands above all of them. This approach, of course, was the goal of
attack in Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in T HE M ARX-ENGELS READER 26 (Robert
Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978).
2. ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, T HE CULTURAL DEFENSE (2004); LEON SHELEFF, T HE
FUTURE OF T RADITION: CUSTOMARY LAW , COMMON LAW , AND LEGAL PLURALISM 262-85
(2000).
3. E.g., EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL ., CONFLICT OF LAWS 1 (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter
SCOLES]; I DICEY AND M ORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 3, 26-27 (Lawrence Collins et
al. eds., 13th ed. 2000).
4. E.g. C H RISTIAN VON BAR & PETER M ANKOWSKI , I INTERNATIONALES
PRIVATRECHT 76-88 (2d ed. 2003); GERHARD KEGEL & KLAUS SCHURIG, INTERNATIONALES
PRIVATRECHT 127-28 (9th ed. 2004).
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moves from the periphery to the center once we view conflict of laws
through the lens of globalization. Globalization reminds us that the state is
constrained not only by other states and supranational organizations but also
by non-state organizations (e.g. NGOs), communities (e.g. religious
groups), and powerful private players (e.g. multinational corporations). All
these actors, in one way or other, play roles in the globalizing world that
were traditionally reserved to the state. One of these roles might be the role
of lawmaker. This idea is articulated in the theory of global legal pluralism,
which posits the existence of a plurality of legal orders created both by
states and by non-state communities.
If, through the lens of globalization, states and non-state communities
both create norms, this must pose a challenge to conflict of law rules that
traditionally only designate state norms as applicable law. Somewhat
surprisingly, far so few have analyzed the confluence of conflict of laws and
global legal pluralism in depth. 5 Authors on global legal pluralism, insofar
as they ever address the interactions between different legal orders, often
use concepts like interlegality. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, who framed the
term,6 defines interlegality as “the impact of legal plurality on the legal
experiences, perception and consciousness of the individuals and social
groups living under conditions of legal plurality, above all the fact that their
everyday life crosses or is interpenetrated by different and often contrasting
legal orders and legal cultures.”7 For choice of law, this “phenomenological
counterpart of legal plurality” 8 is hard to operationalize. 9 Yet, arguably,
5. E.g., Jürgen Basedow, The Effects of Globalization on Private International Law, in
L E G A L A SPECTS OF GLOBALIZATION: CONFLICT OF LAWS, INTERNET, CAPITAL M ARKETS
AND INSOLVENCY IN A G LOBAL M ARKET 1, 6 (Jürgen Basedow & Toshiyuki Kono eds.,
2000); Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining
Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA . L. REV. 1819 (2005) [hereinafter
Berman, Cosmopolitan Vision]; Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and
Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. T RANSNAT’L L. 485 (2005) [hereinafter Berman, Law and
Globalization]; Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA . L. REV.
311 (2002) [hereinafter Berman, Globalization of Jurisdiction]; Andreas Fischer-Lescano
& Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the
Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 M ICH . J. INT’L L. 999 (2004).
6. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading. Towards a Postmodern
Conception of Law, 14 J.L. & SOC’Y 279, 288, 298 (1987).
7. BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, T OWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE 97 (2d
ed. 2002)]. For a sympathetic comment, see W ILLIAM T WINING, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL
T HEORY 229-31 (2002).
8. Santos, supra note 6, at 298; SANTOS, supra note 7, at 437.
9. But see Marc Amstutz, In-Between Worlds—Marleasing and the Emergence of
Interlegality in Legal Reasoning, 11 EUR. L.J. 766 (2005) (attempting to combine choice of
law and interlegality for the relationship between the law of the European Union and the
laws of its member states); see also Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 5, at 1007-08.
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choice of law requires a specific legal way of dealing with legal plurality.
We might hope to find such a way in the writings of conflict of laws
scholars. Yet these scholars usually deal with non-state normative orders (if
at all) without an underlying theory. They typically reject the applicability
of non-state normative orders with the argument that such orders can derive
their authority only from the state, without questioning why this should be
so.
Prima facie, this lack of interaction seems surprising. One would think
both fields could benefit from the encounter. Global legal pluralism would
find an ideal testing ground for the otherwise academic question of whether
non-state normative orders can be recognized as “law.” Conflict of laws
would find an entrance into the world of globalization which, strangely, has
otherwise not had great influence on the field. However, the lack of interest
of each discipline in the other may reflect the fact that the questions they
ask are different, that their tools and instruments are different, and that the
accurate translation of the findings from one discipline to the other is not
possible. Of course, this is all the more reason to analyze these relations.
Indeed, such analyses are starting to emerge.
One of those who first opened our eyes to the potential impact of legal
pluralism on conflict of laws is Paul Berman. While Berman has so far
explicitly left the elaboration of this impact to a later article, 10 his work on
conflict of laws11 and on law and globalization12 already suggests a possible
relation between pluralism and conflict of laws. Berman argues that
lawmaking is not a matter of state power but of community definition;
lawmaking power is not confined to states but can be claimed by all kinds
of communities.13 The law of these communities can become applicable by
others if the communities succeed in what Berman calls jurispersuasion—
convincing others of one’s legitimate lawmaking power.14 States, too,
should acknowledge this lawmaking power of non-state communities.15
This seems to imply, though Berman himself does not say so explicitly, that
such acknowledgement should take place through choice of law rules. In
this way, the normative orders of non-state communities can become
applicable law.
Another author who has dealt with the relationship between global legal

10. Berman, Cosmopolitan Vision, supra note 5, at 1821.
11. Id. at 1863-64.
12. Berman, Law and Globalization, supra note 5, at 507-11, 538-40.
13. Id. at 507-11.
14. Id. at 538-40. For his explication of the term jurispersuasion, see id. at 533-38. See
also Berman, Globalization of Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 502.
15. E.g., Berman, Law and Globalization, supra note 5, at 540.
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pluralism and conflict of laws both alone16 and in a recent article coauthored with Andreas Fischer-Lescano17 is Gunther Teubner. Although
Teubner’s approach to legal pluralism18 is in many respects very different
from Berman’s,19 some elements are quite similar. Like Berman, Teubner
argues that lawmaking in globalization is no longer (if it ever was) a
monopoly of the state. 20 Law is created mainly by non-state communities
in the peripheries, not by invoking an authority, but by using the code of
legal/illegal. This finding has practical implications, as Teubner makes clear
in the example of the new law merchant, or lex mercatoria: “The debate on
lex mercatoria is one of the rare cases in which practical legal decisionmaking becomes directly dependent upon legal theory.”21 Although Teubner
moderates the point somewhat,22 he still seems to imply that, prima facie,
states should be ready to apply non-state normative orders through their
conflict of laws system because legal theory demonstrates that they are law.
Likewise, Fischer-Lescano and Teubner argue for a choice of law concept
“that is not based on the determination of one territorial law which has the
closest relation to the conflict, but which seeks instead to identify the
functional regime to which the legal issue in question belongs.”23 In other
words, a finding of legal theory and legal sociology—law in the world
moves from segmentary differentiation between states to func tional
differentiation between regimes 24—has implications on legal practice, it
forces the state to adapt its choice of law regime.
16. Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13
CARDOZO L. REV. 1443 (1992) [hereinafter Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus].
17. Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 5.
18. See Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus, supra note 16, at 1451; Gunther Teubner,
Global Private Regimes: Neo-spontaneous Law and Dual Constitution of Autonomous
Sectors?, in PUBLIC GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 71 (Karl-Heinz Ladeur
ed., 2004) [hereinafter Teubner, Global Private Regimes]; Gunther Teubner, “Global
Bukowina”: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE
(Gunther Teubner ed., 1997) [hereinafter Teubner, Global Bukowina]; Gunther Teubner,
Dealing with Paradoxes of Law: Derrida, Luhmann, Wiethölter, in PARADOXES A N D
INCONSISTENCIES IN THE LAW 41 (Oren Perez & Gunther Teubner eds., 2005).
19. In fact, Teubner and Fischer-Lescano criticize Berman of “cultural reductionism.”
See Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra, note 5, at 1004 n.18.
20. Teubner, Global Bukowina, supra note 18, at 3-4.
21. Id. at 9; see Gunther Teubner, Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay of Legal and
Social Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP . L. 149, 150 (1997) [hereinafter Teubner, Breaking
Frames].
22. Teubner, Global Bukowina, supra note 18, at 11 (“Of course, legal theory cannot
‘bind’ legal practices of lex mercatoria in their determination of what is legal and what is
not.”).
23. Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 5, at 1021.
24. NIKLAS LUHMANN , DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT 573 (1995).
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This paper uses these approaches as starting point. It is not a critique the
work of Berman or of Teubner on the relationship between pluralism and
c onflict of laws. Berman has left elaboration to a future article, 25 and
Teubner has not developed a full theory of conflict of laws,26 so any such
critique would first have to construct its object before critiquing its own
construction. Neither does this paper set out its own theory of conflict of
laws for global legal pluralism. Instead, my goal is more modest: to attain
conceptual clarity about the encounter of pluralism and conflict of laws that
would make such a theory possible.
To this end, I examine four issues. Part II examines what global legal
pluralism is and to what extent the normative orders created by non-state
communities can be considered “law” from a theoretical standpoint. Part III
is devoted to the question of how state law, including conflict of laws,
currently deals with non-state normative order. I will show that traditional
conflict of laws rejects the applicability of non-state law. However, this
rejection of non-state law by traditional conflict of laws doctrine must be
understood in combination with the other methods the state uses to account
for non-state normative orders, which I call “incorporation,” “deference,”
and “delegation.” The combination shows that the state does acknowledge
non-state normative orders, only it does not acknowledge them as law. This
leads to the third issue, dealt with in Part IV: Why does the state
acknowledge the laws of foreign states as law while denying this status to
non-state normative orders? The reason is that the state would otherwise
undermine its own authoritative position. Treating non-state law as law
weakens its position, while treating the law of foreign states as law actually
strengthens it. Of course, such weakening of the state need not be a bad
thing. In Part V, the fourth issue, therefore, is what a more inclusive
approach to conflict of laws, recognizing non-state normative orders as law,
would require and imply. This fourth issue cannot be examined in full here,
but I will try to show that such a reconceptualization of the state would be
more far-reaching, and potentially less attractive, than proponents of legal
pluralism might wish. I conclude in Part VI with a cautionary note: the
relation between global legal pluralism and conflict of laws is more
complex and may necessitate more radical rethinking of traditional ideas

25. Amstutz, supra note 9.
26. He has, however, previously used conflict of laws methodology as inspiration for
conflict between different communications. See Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 5;
see also GUNTHER T EUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 100-22 (Anne Bankowska
& Ruth Adler trans., Zenon Bankwoski ed., 1993); Gunther Teubner, De Collisione
Discursuum: Communicative Rationalities in Law, Morality, and Politics, 17 CARDOZO L.
REV. 901 (1996) [hereinafter Teubner, De Collisione Discursuum].

2005] THE CHALLENGE FROM GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM

1215

than one might otherwise think.
II. UNCOUPLING LAW FROM THE STATE: NON-STATE NORMATIVE
ORDERS AND GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM
Although law predates the rise of the state by centuries,27 we have, since
the rise of the nation state, come to equate law with state law.28 If
globalization is largely about overcoming the monopolistic position of the
state, 29 then it should also be about overcoming its monopolistic position in
the creation, adjudication, and enforcement of law. This is the postulate of
global legal pluralism.
A. Examples of Non-State Normative Orders
In a world that knows actors other than states, we should expect to find
laws other than state laws. The two examples most prominent in the debate
on globalization are the alleged autonomous law of the Internet and the socalled new lex mercatoria. We should therefore start our analysis here.
1. The Autonomous Law of the Internet
Does the Internet have, or even constitute, its own legal order? This was
the topic of the well-known debate in the 1990s between David Johnson and
David Post and Jack Goldsmith about conflict of laws in the Internet.30 That
debate had two related levels, one conceptual and one normative.
Conceptually, Johnson and Post argued that the Internet had its own space31

27. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 49-83 (1983).
28. Walter O. Weyrauch & Maureen A. Bell, Autonomous Lawmaking: The Case of the
“Gypsies,” 103 YALE L.J. 323, 326 (1993). For the history of the relation between state and
law, see SANTOS, COMMON SENSE , supra note 7, at 21-84; David B. Goldman, Historical
Aspects of Globalization and Law, in JURISPRUDENCE FOR AN INTERCONNECTED GLOBE 43
(Catherine Dauvergne ed., 2003).
29. Of course, the role of the state in globalization is more complex and controversial.
For an overview of positions, see DAVID HELD & ANTHONY M CGREW, T HE GLOBAL
T RANSFORMATIONS READER 105-81 (2d ed. 2003).
30. For a summary and analysis of the debate, see Berman, Globalization of
Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 371-77, 406-11.
31. David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1378-89 (1996); see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND
OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 190 (1999).
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that gave it its own territorial sovereignty32 with its own legal order.33 This
led them to the normative argument that states should apply, or at least not
interfere with, the autonomous law of the Internet. Goldsmith challenged
both claims. On the conceptual level, he rejected the idea of cyberspace as
its own space outside real space with its own legal order.3 4 Even if
transactions took place through the Internet, he argued, their relevant effects
happened to real people, in real locations, under the sovereign power of real
states.35 Normatively, Goldsmith saw no need to change the principles of
conflict of laws because he considered online transactions to be functionally
identical to offline transactions.36 In a rejoinder, Post made a more modest
claim than before. Instead of reiterating the theme of the Internet as a virtual
territory with its own law, he now emphasized that, because technological
change had brought about changes in conflict of laws at earlier times of
technological progress, the new technology of the Internet should bring
about a similar change in approach now.37
Not all details of the debate are relevant for the purposes of this essay.
Arguably, Johnson and Post overestimated, while Goldsmith
underestimated, the novel character of the Internet.38 What matters here is
32. See LESSIG, supra note 31, at 198. (“To the extent that architectures in cyberspace
are rules that affect behavior, the space is sovereign.”).
33. David G. Post, Governing Cyberspace, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 155, 167 (1996);
Johnson & Post, supra note 31, at 1380-87; see David R. Johnson et al., The Accountable
Internet: Peer Production of Internet Governance, 9 VA . J. L. & T ECH . 1 (2004). For an
analysis of self-regulation on the Internet, see M ONROE E. PRICE & STEFAAN G. VERHULST,
SELF-REGULATION AND THE INTERNET (2005). For a number of mostly libertarian articles
on Internet self-governance, see WHO RULES THE NET? INTERNET GOVERNANCE AN D
JURISDICTION (Adam Thierer & Clyde W. Crews Jr. eds., 2003). Cf. Berman, Globalization
of Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 409.
34. Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1239-40, 1250
(1998).
35. Id. at 1239-40; see Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance
of Territorial Sovereignty, 5 IND . J. GLOBAL L. STUD. 475, 479 (1998). A dramatic example
was recently reported from China, in an internet role game. A man had been defrauded, in
an internet role game, of a virtual weapon. After the police were unwilling to help him, he
took the matter into his own hands, found out the real person behind the virtual character
that had taken his weapon, and killed him. See Jonathan Watts, Harsh Reality of China’s
Fantasy Craze: Online Games Blamed for Thefts, Suicides and Murders, T HE GUARDIAN,
Mar. 31, 2005, at 15.
36. Goldsmith, supra note 34, at 1233-36. For a similar argument, see Peter
Mankowski, Das Internet im Internationalen Vertrags- und Deliktsrecht, 63 RABELS
Z EITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ] 203
(1999).
37. David G. Post, Against “Against Cyberanarchy,” 17 BERKELEY T ECH . L. J. 1365
(2002); see Berman, Globalization of Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 409.
38. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 31, at 193. However, Lessig himself seems to
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a point Post raises regarding whether or not Internet transactions are
“functionally identical” to offline transactions: “it depends entirely on the
question you are asking:” 39
To the extent that our question requires us to ask whether “real
people in one territorial jurisdiction [are] transacting with [other]
real people in other territorial jurisdictions,” cyberspace and
realspace transactions are, for that purpose, identical. To the extent
that our question requires us to ask something else—whether, say,
they involve bits and software, or instantaneous communication
with enormous numbers of people across the global network,
etc.—they are not.40
This shifts the question from a conceptual or even an ontological
one—how different is the internet in reality from traditional space, to what
extent is it in reality its own space—to a normative one—which factors are
relevant for our specific purposes. In order to determine jurisdiction and
applicable law, is the relevant factor the place of conduct and effects within
countries? Then, indeed, the Internet does not need any new rules; and its
own rules are not extraterritorial laws.41 Or is the crucial fact that the
Internet adds a tremendous amount of complexity, that territorial
connections are irrelevant, as Post holds?42 If so, then, maybe the Internet
really requires new rules or a new approach. Of course, by rephrasing the
issue like this, it becomes clear that the state is not in any way forced to
recognize the internal order of the Internet as law or to deny it that status.
Rather, the question has become one of choice. As Richard Ford has put it,
“[i]f the Internet becomes cyberspace, it will be because we made it so.”43
Whether the Internet has its own legal order depends on whether we
recognize it as one. Is this recognition in the sense of conflict of laws? Is it
an acknowledgment that the normative order of the Internet can be the
applicable law in a choice of law process, that “decisions” of the Internet
should be enforced by state courts? Although they do not say so explicitly,
Johnson and Post argue in this direction when they ask the state to grant
comity to the normative order of the Internet.44 Comity becomes for them
overemphasize the novelty of the Internet with regard to conflicts of laws. Id. at 192-94.
39. Post, supra note 37, at 1374.
40. Id. at 1376 (internal quote omitted).
41. Goldsmith, supra note 34.
42. Post, supra note 37, at 1376-81.
43. Richard Ford, Against Cyberspace, in T HE PLACE OF LAW 147, 151 (Austin Sarat
et al., eds., 2003).
44. See Johnson & Post, supra note 31, at 1391-95. The authors combine comity with
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a (somewhat crude) conflict of laws norm based on (non-)governmental
interests and regulatory advantage, 45 mandating that “those who care more
deeply about and better understand the disputed activity should determine
the outcome.”46 It is telling that although Goldsmith focuses much more
explicitly on conflict of laws, he considers only conflicts between state laws
and does not even address the implied claim that conflict of laws between
state law and Internet law is possible. 47 Whether a conflict of laws problem
exists or not becomes a matter of perspective.
2. The New Lex Mercatoria
Another alleged body of non-state law is the so-called “new lex
mercatoria.”48 Law merchant, or lex mercatoria, actually refers to at least
two historically distinct ideas of laws: the medieval lex mercatoria and the
“new lex mercatoria.”49 As the theory goes, the old lex mercatoria was the
non-national law of international commerce—created not by the authority
of states but rather by and within international commerce itself. This nonstate law was recognized not only in several treatises 50 but also in decisions
delegation, although both are analytically different instruments. For my own concept of
delegation, see infra Part III. D.
45. Comity is still frequently considered the basis for conflict of laws in U.S. conflict
of laws. For the history of the concept, see ALAN WATSON, A COMITY OF ERRORS (1992).
46. Johnson & Post, supra note 31, at 1392. The first prong of their test (“care more
deeply”) sounds like a comparative impairment test, and the second one (“better
understand”) sounds like a test of regulatory advantage. For comparative impairment as a
choice of law test, see William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN.
L. REV. 1 (1963). For regulatory advantage, see RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 602-03 (6th ed. 2002). Later, Johnson & Post develop a public policy exception of the
Internet against state regulation, based on its fundamental policy of free speech. Johnson &
Post, supra note 31, at 1394-95. It is not clear on what grounds such a policy exception by
the internet should be binding for the state.
47. See Goldsmith, supra note 34.
48. Internet law has frequently been linked to lex mercatoria. For two early
occurrences, see Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for “Cyberspace,” 55 U. PITT. L.
REV. 993, 1019-21 (1994) and Raj Bhala, Self-Regulation in Global Electronic Markets
Through Reinvigorated Trade Usages, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 863, 902-05 (1995). See also
Johnson & Post, supra note 31, at 1389; Leon E. Trakman, From the Medieval Law
Merchant to E-Merchant Law, 53 U. T ORONTO L.J. 265 (2003).
49. An excellent history and historiography of old and new lex mercatoria is Nikitas
Hatzimihail, The Many Lives—and Faces—of Lex Mercatoria: An Essay on the Genealogy
of International Business Law (on file with author); see Nicholas H. D. Foster, Foundation
Myth as Legal Formant: The Medieval Law Merchant and the New Lex Mercatoria (Mar.
18, 2005), available at http://www.forhistiur.de/zitat/0503foster.htm (Last visited Oct. 30,
2005)].
50. See, e.g., LEX MERCATORIA AND LEGAL PLURALISM: A LATE T HIRTEENTH -CENTURY
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by judges of the state. 51 For example, Gerard Malynes explained lex
mercatoria in 1622 as “customary law approved by the authority of all
kingdoms and not as law established by the sovereignty of any prince.”52 In
a 1765 decision that Justice Story would later cite with approval in Swift v.
Tyson, 53 Lord Mansfield explained that “[t]he law of merchants, and the law
of the land, is the same: a witness can not be admitted, to prove the law of
merchants. We must consider it as a point of law.”54 This old body of nonstate law has been invoked in attempts to revitalize the idea since the middle
of the twentieth century.55 In France, Berthold Goldman developed a
concept of lex mercatoria as a legal order that developed on the basis of
party autonomy claimed by merchants in a private, spontaneous way.56 In
England, Clive Schmitthoff saw a convergence of national trade laws and
non-state trade practices, including standard terms, developing into a new
transnational lex mercatoria. 57 In Germany, Klaus Peter Berger has more
recently developed a system of “creeping codification of the lex
mercatoria.”58 Like the old lex mercatoria, the new lex mercatoria is said to
be an autonomous non-state legal order with special rules and special
adjudicating bodies—in particular, arbitral panels.59 Like the old lex
mercatoria, the new lex mercatoria should be acknowledged and applied by
the courts of the state. 60
T REATISE AND ITS AFTERLIFE (Mary Elizabeth Basile et al. eds. & trans., 1998); GERARD
M ALYNES, LEX M ERCATORIA, THE ANCIENT LAW -M ERCHANT 3 (Katie F. Hamilton ed., 2d
ed. 2001) (1622); WYNDHAM BEAWES, LEX MERCATORIA REDIVIVA , OR THE M ERCHANT’S
DIRECTORY , BEING A COMPLETE GUIDE TO ALL MEN IN BUSINESS (4th ed. 1783).
51. See, e.g., Pillans v. Van Mierop, (1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 (K. B.)].
52. M ALYNES, supra note 50, i-3 to i-4. Modern analysts tend to disregard the
requirement of approval by the sovereign.
53. 41 U.S. 1, 20 (1842).
54. Pillans, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1038. Cf. id. at 1041 (Aston, J., dissenting) (“If there be
such a custom of merchants as has been alledged [sic], it may be found by a jury: but it is
the Court, not the jury, who are to determine the law.”).
55. The literature is boundless. For a representative collection of essays, see LE X
M ERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1990). More recently, see
also A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND PUBLIC AUTHORITY : T RANSNATION A L
M ERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2003); Peer Zumbansen, Piercing
the Legal Veil: Commercial Arbitration and Transnational Law, 8 EUR. L.J. 400 (2002).
56. See Berthold Goldman, Frontières du droit et “lex mercatoria,” 9 ARCHIVES DE
PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 177 (1964); BERTHOLD GOLDMAN , LEX M ERCATORIA (1983).
57. See Clive M. Schmitthoff, International Business Law: A New Law Merchant, in
2 CURRENT LAW AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 132 (R. St. J. Macdonald ed., 1961).
58. KLAUS PETER BERGER, T HE CREEPING C O DIFICATION OF THE LEX M ERCATORIA
(1999); Charles N. Brower & Jeremy K. Sharpe, The Creeping Codification of Transnational
Commercial Law: An Arbitrator’s Perspective, 45 VA . L. INT’L L. 199 (2004).
59. See, e.g., Zumbansen, supra note 55, at 402-17.
60. See Andreas Kappus , “Lex mercatoria” als Geschäftsstatut vor Staatlichen
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Like the autonomous law of the Internet, lex mercatoria is contested
both on conceptual and normative grounds. This is true already for the
alleged ancient lex mercatoria, which, at least as a substantive body of law,
was in all likelihood a myth.61 Similarly, opponents of the new lex
mercatoria argue that it is not “law” in a meaningful sense but at best a
developing normative order of trade customs and of “case law” for
arbitrators, which is always connected back to the law of the state in two
ways. First, it can become applicable only insofar as state law recognizes
it through the granting of freedom of contract. Second, since arbitral
decisions can be enforced only by the state’s courts, the state gets the last
word on recognition or rejection of lex mercatoria. 62 Proponents, on the
other hand, point out that the new merchant has all the elements necessary
for state law 63 including even the internal problems of state law.64 Again, the
answer depends on the question—is lex mercatoria sufficiently comparable
to state law, as proponents argue, or does it lack the formal elements of state
law, as opponents hold?
Even more prominent than the debate concerning the Internet is the
debate as to whether lex mercatoria can be the applicable “law” in litigation.
This debate focuses mostly on arbitration but also addresses state courts and
state conflict of laws.65 Proponents point out that lex mercatoria is not only
law in every relevant sense but is even superior to national laws because of
its transnational character.66 Opponents, on the other hand, emphasize that
no contract can exist outside a national legal order and that therefore lex
mercatoria cannot substitute for a national applicable law.67

Gerichten im Deutschen Internationalen Schuldrecht, 13 P RAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN
PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS [IPRax] 137 (1993).
61. See Oliver Volckart & Antje Mangels, Are the Roots of the Modern Lex Mercatoria
Really Medieval?, 65 S. ECON. J. 427 (1999); Albrecht Cordes, The Search for a Medieval
Lex Mercatoria, OX. U. COMP . L. FORUM (2003); Charles Donahue Jr., Medieval and Early
Modern Lex Mercatoria: An Attempt at the Probatio Diabolica, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 21 (2004);
Stephen E. Sachs, From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of the Medieval
“Law Merchant,” 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. (forthcoming 2006); Foster, supra note 49; but
see Emily Kadens, Order Within Law, Variety Within Custom: The Character of the
Medieval Merchant Law, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 39 (2004).
62. VON BAR & M ANKOWSKI , supra note 4, at 81.
63. E.g., Teubner, Global Bukowina, supra note 18.
64. Zumbansen, supra note 55, at 417-28.
65. Compare Friedrich Juenger, The Lex Mercatoria and Private International Law,
60 LA . L. REV. 1133, 1141 (2000), with VON BAR & M ANKOWSKI , supra note 4, at 86-88.
66. E.g., Juenger, supra note 65.
67. E.g., VON BAR & M ANKOWSKI , supra note 4, at 81.

2005] THE CHALLENGE FROM GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM

1221

B. From State Legal Pluralism to Global Legal Pluralism
Both in the realm of the Internet and in that of the new lex mercatoria,
the decisive question is whether these normative orders are “law.” This is
the question addressed by theories of legal pluralism,68 sometimes also
called legal plurality69 or legal polycentricity.70 Legal pluralism posits that
the state is not the only producer of law; non-state communities can produce
law as well. 71 The old concept of legal pluralism, sometimes called state
legal pluralism, posed no threat to the state’s legal authority because it
acknowledged the central position of the state and assumed the various nonstate legal orders existed only under its umbrella. 72 Legal anthropologists
recognized non-state legal orders, especially in colonies.73 Western
colonizing nations had introduced their own legal orders to their colonies,
but below those, with or without the acknowledgment of the official law,
other legal orders lived on.74
Originally focusing mainly on non-Western societies, legal
anthropologists looked mainly to colonies and their laws.75 Soon, however,
researchers found that, although the coexistence of various legal orders was
more openly present in colonial systems, such a normative plurality existed
in Western states as well. 76 In fact, such an analysis had already been done.
68. See WARWICK T IE, LEGAL PLURALISM (1999); J ØRGEN DALBERG -LARSEN, T HE
UNITY OF LAW : AN ILLUSION? (2000); Gordon R. Woodman, Ideological Combat and Social
Observation: Recent Debate about Legal Pluralism, 42 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 21 (1998);
Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?, 47 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 37
(2002) [hereinafter von Benda-Beckmann]; William Twining, A Post-Westphalian
Conception of Law, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 199, 248-51 (2003).
69. See SANTOS, supra note 7, at 89-98.
70. See Surya P. Sinha, Legal Polycentricity, in CONSEQUENCES OF PLURALISM IN LAW
(Hanne Petersen & Henrik Zahle eds., 1995); SURYA PRAKASH SINHA , LEGAL
POLYCENTRICITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996). The analogue in political science is
sometimes called multicentric governance. See DAVID HELD , GLOBAL COVENANT 75-86
(2004).
71. von Benda-Beckmann, supra note 68, at 37.
72. See M. B. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAL AND NEO COLONIAL LAWS (1975). For an analysis of the relationship between state and law from the
perspective of legal pluralism, see von Benda-Beckmann, supra note 68, at 52-57.
73. For legal pluralism as a phenomenon of colonialism and post-colonialism, see
LAUREN BENTON, LAW AND COLONIAL CULTURES 2-3, 9-10 (2002).
74. Id.
75. For a distinction between two periods of legal pluralism, one focusing on colonial
and postcolonial societies and one focusing on modern capitalist societies, see Sally Engle
Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 869 (1988).
76. Cf. BENTON, supra note 73, at 9 (“Colonies were not distinctive because they
contained plural legal orders but because struggles within them made the structure of the
plural legal order more explicit.”); see Lauren Benton, Beyond Legal Pluralism: Towards
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Early in the twentieth century, Eugen Ehrlich had developed the idea that,
even within the Western nation state, a multiplicity of normative orders
existed which deserved to be called law.77 Ehrlich juxtaposed law in the
books and living law and postulated that the essence of law was not
produced in texts or by state authorities but was developed in society:78
“The center of gravity of legal development therefore from time
immemorial has not lain in the activity of the state, but in society itself, and
must be sought there at the present time.”79 As a consequence, a plurality of
legal orders, most of them non-state orders, could co-exist within one
territory. The state provided an elaborate system of conflict of laws to
mediate between the different legal orders.80 At the same time, the state still
provided the overarching, universal umbrella of a supreme and subsuming
legal authority.81
This phenomenon of state legal pluralism has been criticized as being
unduly centered on the state82 and for that reason unduly ethnocentric,83
since the state is a peculiarly Western concept. Therefore, more recent

a New Approach to Law in the Informal Sector, 3 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 223 (1994).
77. EUGEN EHRLICH , FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 13-14,
passim (1936) (2d ed. 2002). The most comprehensive study of Ehrlich’s life and work is
STEFAN VOGL , SOZ I A L E G E S E T Z G E B U N G S P O L I T I K , FREIE RECHTSFINDUNG UND
SOZIOLOGISCHE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT BEI EUGEN E HRLICH (2003). See Assaf Likhovski,
Czernowitz, Lincoln, Jerusalem, and the Comparative History of American Jurisprudence,
4 T HEORETICAL INQUIRES L. 621, 626-29 (2003) (referencing unfortunately only sources in
English); see also David Nelken, Law in Action or Living Law? Back to the Beginning in
Sociology of Law, 4 LEGAL STUD. 157, 165 (1984).
78. Eugen Ehrlich, Die Erforschung des lebenden Rechts, 35 SCHMOLLERS JAHRBUCH
FÜR G ESETZGEBUNG, VERWALTUNG UND VOLKSWIRTSCHAFT IM D EUTS C H E N R EICH 129
(1911); Eugen Ehrlich, Das lebende Recht der Völker der Bukowina, 1 RECHT UND
WIRTSCHAFT 273, 322 (1912). Both articles are reprinted in EUGEN EHRLICH , RECHT UND
LEBEN 11, 43 (Manfred Rehbinder. ed., 1967).
79. EHRLICH , supra note 77, at 390. For Ehrlich, this was the one sentence that
“contains the substance of every attempt to state the fundamental principles of the sociology
of law.” Id. at xv.
80. A classical text on the treatment of non-Western law in conflict of laws is Roe Duco
Kollewijn, Conflicts of Western and Non-Western Law, 4 INT’L . L.Q. 307 (1951). See G.W.
Bartholomew, Private Interpersonal Law, 1 INT’L & COMP . L.Q. 325 (1952); Kurt Lipstein
& István Szászy, Interpersonal Conflict of Laws, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW (Vol. III/10 1985).
81. See, e.g., ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS 281-84 (1975).
82. See John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1986);
Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Roderick A. Macdonald, What is a Critical Legal Pluralism? 12
CAN . J. L. & SOC’Y 25, 30-33 (1997).
83. See Christoph Eberhard, Towards an Intercultural Legal Theory: The Dialogical
Challenge, 1 0 SO C . & LEGAL STUD. 171, 176-181 (2001) (describing the work of legal
anthropologist Michel Alliot); von Benda-Beckmann, supra note 68, at 53-55.
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approaches attempt to generalize the idea of legal pluralism. Since this
rejection to grant a central position for the state mirrors a similar rejection
in globalization theory, the approach has been used for globalization under
the notion of global legal pluralism.84 For example, Gunther Teubner has
expanded both Ehrlich’s living law and the traditional understanding of
legal pluralism to a global theory, under the title of “global Bukowina,”
invoking Ehrlich’s studies of the Bukowina as an area with numerous
different non-state legal orders.85 Francis Snyder has developed a concept
of global legal pluralism consisting of a structural element—the
involvement of “a variety of institutions, norms, and dispute resolution
processes located, and produced, at different structured sites around the
world,”86—and a relational element, concerning the relations between such
sites. 8 7 Oren Perez presents, under the name of global legal pluralism (but
without explicit relation to theories of legal pluralism), a more public-laworiented concept of legitimate authority of non-state actors.88 Boaventura de
84. The term is used with different meanings, most prominently by Francis Snyder,
Oren Perez, and Gunther Teubner. See the references in the following footnotes. For other
authors using the concept, see Martti Koskenniemi, Global Legal Pluralism: Multiple
Regimes and Multiple Modes of Thought 12-17 (2005), available at
http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/blogs/eci/PluralismHarvard.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2005); Sally
E. M e r r y , Human Rights and Global Legal Pluralism: Reciprocity and Disjuncture, in
M OBILE PEOPLE M OBILE LAW 215 (Franz von Benda-Beckmann et al. eds., 2005). See also
Berman, Law and Globalization, supra note 5, at 538-40; Keebet von Benda-Beckmann,
Globalisation and Legal Pluralism, 4 INT’L L. FORUM DU DROIT INT’L 19 (2002); Luca
Giuseppe Pes, Il Pluralismo Giuridico, 190-205 (2003), available at
http://www.dhdi.free.fr/recherches/theoriedroit/memoires/pesmemoir.pdf (last visited
Oct. 31, 2005). The application of pluralist theory to transnational legal processes predates
the term; see Sally Engle Merry, Anthropology, Law and Transnational Processes, 21 ANN .
REV. OF ANTHROPOLOGY 357 (1992).
85. Teubner, Global Bukowina, supra note 18, at 16; Fischer-Lescano & Teubner,
supra note 8, at 1009-12; Teubner, Global Private Regimes, supra note 18.
86. Francis Snyder, Governing Economic Globalisation: Global Legal Pluralism and
European Law, 5 EUR. L.J. 334, 342 (1999).
87. Id.; see Francis Snyder, Global Economic Networks and Global Legal Pluralism,
in T RANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION 100 (George Bermann et al. eds., 2000);
Francis Snyder, Economic Globalization and the Law in the Twenty-First Century, in T HE
BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 624 (Austin Sarat ed., 2003); Francis
Snyder, Éthique, OMC et pluralisme juridique mondial: Réflexions sur la gouvernance de
la mondialisation, in M ONDIALISATION ET ÉTHIQUE DES ÉCHANGES (Yves Nauder ed., 2003);
INTERNATIONAL FOOD SECURITY A N D GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM (Francis Snyder ed.,
2004).
88. Oren Perez, Normative Creativity and Global Legal Pluralism: Reflections on the
Democratic Critique of Transnational Law, 10 IND . J. GLOBAL L EGAL STUD. 25 (2003);
OREN PEREZ, ECOLOGICA L SENSITIVITY AND GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM (2004); Oren
Perez, Global Legal Pluralism and Electronic Democracy, in ELECTRONIC DEMOCRACY
M OBILISATION, ORGANISATION AND PARTICIPATION VIA NEW ICT S 133 (Routledge ECPR
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Sousa Santos postulates a third period of legal pluralism after the traditional
pluralism of the colonial/postcolonial context and the new pluralism of the
modern capitalist state, 89 a third period which he describes as “postmodern
legal plurality.”90 William Twining presents a somewhat similar theory of
a plurality of legal systems, of which the law of the state is only one. 91
Finally, Paul Schiff Berman, drawing on the work of Robert Cover,92 draws
a world of multiple overlapping communities, both territorial and nonterritorial, that define themselves through the assertion of jurisdiction and
in turn have jurisdiction because they are communities.93 One consequence
is that “the state does not hold a monopoly on the articulation and exercise
of legal norms;”94 non-state communities 95 produce laws as well and assert
jurisdiction.96 Jurisdiction, in this sense, is defined not as the assertion of
state power (which, by definition, would be exclusive to the state) but rather
as “the locus for debates about community definition, sovereignty, and
legitimacy.”97
C. Criteria for Determining “Law”
There are considerable differences between these concepts and among
the theorists supporting them. There are disciplinary differences between
commercial (Malynes, Berger), sociological (Ehrlich, Santos),
anthropological (Berman), and jurisprudential (Twining, Teubner)

Studies In European Political Science No. 33, Rachel Gibson et al. eds., 2004).
89. Merry, supra note 75, at 872.
90. SANTOS, supra note 7, at 92.
91. T WINING, supra note 7, at 82-88, 224-33; Twining, supra note 68.
92. See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983)
[hereinafter Cover, Nomos and Narrative]; Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales
of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP . U. L. REV. 179 (1985). For another reading of Cover’s theory of
jurisdiction as a theory of legal pluralism, see Emmanuel Melissaris, The More the Merrier?
A New Take on Legal Pluralism, 13 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 57, 65-68 (2004).
93. Berman, Globalization of Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 427, 435-38, 501-12.
94. Id. at 493; cf. id. at 510 (“[T]he nation-state is denied any special status as a lawgiver.”).
95. Id. at 472-90 (distinguishing subnational, transnational, supranational and
cosmopolitan communities); cf. T WINING, supra note 7, at 139 (distinguishing global,
international, regional, transnational, inter-communal, sub-state and non-state levels of law).
96. Berman, Globalization of Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 323. “[I]f nation states are
imagined, historically contingent communities . . . and if those nation-states . . . no longer
define unified communities (if they ever did), then there is no conceptual justification for
conceiving of nation-states as possessing a monopoly on the assertion of jurisdiction.” Id.
at 464.
97. Id. at 319.
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approaches. Methodologically, too, approaches differ from pragmatism,98
to postmodernism,99 to feminism,100 to systems theory. 101 Yet all agree, in
one way or another, that “law” cannot and should not be restricted to the
law of the state. Of course, this leaves the problem of finding another
criterion, and “where do we stop speaking of law and find ourselves simply
describing social life?”102 Most theorists are unhappy with the idea that “all
social control is more or less ‘legal’;” 1 0 3 yet, they disagree about what the
appropriate criteria should be.
By and large, one can distinguish two strands of criteria, depending on
whether an outside observer or a participant is asked to distinguish law from
non-law. The first strand represents the focus of a neutral, outside observer
who wants to assess whether an observed normative order is law. To
achieve objective criteria, many theorists use a functional definition of law.
They call those orders “law” that fulfill the same functions as state law—for
example, social control104 or the resolution (or avoidance) of disputes.105
Thus, if non-state orders similarly fulfill these functions, they must also be
called and treated as law. Other outside observers use a structural rather
than a functional definition of “law.” For example, Bronislaw Malinowski
defined law through the structural device of obligations which create rights
on one side and duties on the other.106
Theorists using the strand of internal criteria to assess what is law look
at participants in a normative order and whether they treat what they have
as law. Some theorists focus on language. They ask whether a particular
normative order uses the binary code of legal/illegal107 or, more simply,
whether a normative order carries the label “law.”108 Other theorists focus
98. Klaus Peter Berger, The New Law Merchant and the Global Market Place, in T HE
PRACTICE OF T RANSNATIONAL LAW 1, 3 (Klaus Peter Berger ed., 2001).
99. SANTOS, supra note 7; see Santos, supra note 6, 293 (1987) (identifying legal
pluralism as “the key concept in a post-modern view of law”).
100. Ambreena S. Manji, Imagining Women’s “Legal World”: Towards a Feminist
Theory of Legal Pluralism in Africa, 8 SOC. & LEG . STUDIES 435 (1999).
101. Teubner, Global Bukowina, supra note 18, at 11.
102. Merry, Legal Pluralism, supra note 75, at 878.
103. Griffiths, supra note 82, at 39 n.3.
104. Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field
as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 L. & SOC. REV. 719, 721 (1973); Griffiths, supra note
82, at 50 n.41; Woodman, supra note 68, at 45.
105. SANTOS, supra note 7, at 86.
106. BRONISLAW M ALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY 55 (1926).
107. LUHMANN , supra note 24, at 60, 61, 67-75, 165-87; Teubner, The Two Faces of
Janus, supra note 16, at 1451.
108. BRIAN T AMANAHA , A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY 193
(2001); see Twining, supra note 68, at 223-31; Melissaris, supra note 92, at 69-70.
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not on language but on the creation of communities. For them, law, or
jurisdiction, is how communities assert themselves as communities.109
Finally, other theorists in this second strand rely less on societal than on
individual definitions. “Critical” legal pluralism adopts an
“autobiographical” definition of law by the self and “presumes that legal
subjects hold each of their multiple narrating selves up to the scrutiny of
each of their other narrating selves, and up to the scrutiny of all the other
narrated selves projected upon them by others.”110
Obviously, these criteria will frequently lead to different results. Also,
none of them is fully convincing. Functional approaches are problematic for
two reasons. First, state law fulfills a number of functions. Since few
normative orders will fulfill all the functions that state law fulfills, one must
choose the relevant function; but that choice must be arbitrary. Second, in
any system, the functions of law can be fulfilled by functionally equivalent
institutions that are not law. By calling all of these institutions “law,” the
term loses it analytical purchase. A structural explanation focusing on
“binding obligations” encounters the problem of distinguishing legal from
other obligations and, consequently, law from customs, as Bohannan
pointed out again Malinowski. 111 The focus on language creates problems
of translation, such as determining the code “legal/illegal” and the
equivalent of “law” in the perhaps esoteric language of a non-state
society.112 The mere focus on communities definition tends to essentialize
cultural—law becomes a mere derivative from an assumed a priori idea of
culture. 113 Again, the question of whether or not non-state orders qualify as
“law” cannot be answered in the abstract. Again, “it depends entirely on the
question you are asking.”114
At the same time, the answer to this question does not have direct
consequences. Therefore, legal theorists may consider it futile but also
unnecessary to distinguish strictly legal and non-legal. 115 Nothing follows
directly from characterizing a certain normative order as “law.” This is an
almost necessary consequence of the criteria used. If the determining
109. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text; see generally Brian Tamanaha, The
Folly of the ‘Social Scientific’ Concept of Legal Pluralism, 20 J.L. & SOC’Y 192 (1993).
110. Kleinhans & Macdonald, supra note 82, at 46.
111. Paul Bohannan, The Different Realms of the Law, 67 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 33,
36 (1967).
112. Cf. T AMANAHA , supra note 108, at 189-91.
113. This is the criticism voiced again Paul Berman by Fischer-Lescano & Teubner,
supra note 5, at 1004 n.18. The criticism is not entirely justified however. Berman combines
community definition with the additional element of jurispersuasion. See infra part IV.D.
114. Post, supra note 39.
115. Twining, supra note 68, at 248-49.
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criterion focuses on the view of an outside observer (function, structure),
then such a characterization may be helpful for the observer’s comparative
or analytical projects, but it does not yield normative conclusions for
participants. If, on the other hand, the determining criterion focuses on the
participant’s perspective (language, community definition), then it yields
valuable insights on that participant’s views but no insight as to the
implications of this perspective for other normative systems, including the
perspective of the state. Much legal pluralism is in this sense uncritical. This
is not to say that there is not frequently a political project behind legal
pluralism.116 Early on, much of the old state legal pluralism was directed
against the dictatorship of Western state law, first in the colonies and then
in Western countries themselves. At the same time, much of this old state
legal pluralism was used to justify colonial rule vis-à-vis non-state legal
orders, which were often the artificial creation of local elites rather than
independently valid norms. Similarly, global legal pluralism rests on a
politic of recognition:117 multiple groups claim recognition of their status,
their autonomy, and their lawmaking capacity vis-à-vis the monopoly of the
state. Yet these political projects are not inherent in the analytical concepts
used.
III. RE-STATING GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM : T HE T REATMENT OF NONSTATE LAW AS NON-LAW
There is a field, however, that combines the outsider’s view with the
participant’s normative interest; and that is choice of law. A court applying
foreign law is an outside observer of that law; yet at the same time, it is
obliged to apply that law in the spirit of a participant.118 In addition, choice
of law is a field for which the distinction of law and non-law is practically
important because choice of law rules determine the applicable law, not
non-law. Both of these points make the perspective of conflict of laws on
global legal pluralism particularly interesting. In fact, choice of law can
provide us with the best forum in which to debate the practical implications
of legal pluralism. Legal pluralism is about law; is it therefore also about
choice of law? Legal pluralism is about recognition; is it therefore also

116. For the unclear relation between analytical and political projects of legal
pluralism, see SANTOS, supra note 7, at 89-91.
117. Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in M ULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING
THE P OLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25 (Amy Gutman ed., 1994).
118. See Nils Jansen & Ralf Michaels, Die Auslegung und Fortbildung ausländischen
Rechts, 116 Z EITSCHRIFT FÜR Z IVILPROZE ß 3 (2002).
.
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about the recognition of decisions? What, in fact, is the connection between
global legal pluralism and conflict of laws? Can the state (with its
institutions and in particular its courts) ignore the emerging non-state
normative orders, or must the state eventually accommodate these orders as
law?
The answer in regard to actual state practice is both yes and no. It will
become apparent that non-state normative orders are almost never the
applicable law under current choice of law analysis. However, this does not
mean that the state is blind to such orders. Not recognizing the normative
orders of non-state communities as law does not mean that the state is
altogether ignoring these orders. A totalitarian state may try to do this; it
may claim a normative monopoly. The liberal state, on the other hand,
grants spaces of freedom, including the freedom to set non-state norms.
This suggests that the liberal state can claim no more than legal supremacy.
It does not deny the existence of other normative orders, but it either
designates such orders as non-legal or it subordinates such orders to the
state’s own law. Normative orders are thus defined, by the state, with
relation to the state. They are, in other words, “re-stated.”
There are, in fact, a number of different ways for the state to deal with
non-state norms. I suggest a typology of three such ways besides rejections:
incorporation, delegation, and deference. 119 Incorporation is the
transformation of non-state law into domestic law. Deference is the
transformation of non-state law into facts. Delegation is the transformation
of non-state law into subordinated state law. For an accurate picture, it is
necessary to look at all of these methods together.
A. Rejection—The Restriction of Applicable Law to State Law
Viewed narrowly, it may seem that the state rejects global legal
pluralism. Through its choice of law regime, the state rejects any claim by
non-state normative orders to be treated as law virtually without exception.
To that extent, it rejects global legal pluralism. Thus, the ongoing debate
about the character of the new lex mercatoria as “law” has not, it seems, led
any national court to apply this new lex mercatoria as recognized law.120
119. For a comparable typology, see Steven Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW . U.
L. REV. 319, 324-29 (2002). Berman also discusses these three different types of interaction
but does not distinguish between them. See Berman, Globalization of Jurisdiction, supra
note 5, at 505-06 (stating “official legal actors may delegate lawmaking authority to nonstate entities” [delegation], “or recognize the efficacy of non-state norms” [recognition], and
“the norms they [i.e. non-state actors] articulate often seep into the decisions of state legal
institutions” [incorporation]).
120. See, e.g., Shamil Bank of Bahrain v. Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2003)
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True, courts have sometimes declared arbitral awards enforceable when
based on the application of lex mercatoria. Proponents of the new lex
mercatoria often point to such decisions to prove that state courts now
recognize lex mercatoria as law.121 Yet this argument rests on a confusion
between choice of law and the recognition of arbitral awards.122 States
recognize and enforce arbitral awards without allowing re-litigation on the
merits. In particular, the enforcing court will not normally second-guess
whether the arbitrator applied the correct law in a choice of law analysis.
Even arbitral awards based not on the application of any law but given ex
aequo et bono are enforced.123 In other words, the arbitral award is enforced
regardless of what law was applied. This is the opposite of an explicit
endorsement of the applied normative order as “law.”
The situation is similar for another non-state normative order: Islamic
law or Shari’a. To the extent that Islamic law has been formally adopted as
the law of a country, it becomes applicable as that country’s law. Without
such adoption, however, as non-state law Islamic law remains outside the
choice of applicable laws. A recent English case illustrates this neatly.124
Parties to a contract concerning Islamic banking had agreed that English
law was applicable, but that the contract was “subject to the principles of
the Glorious Shari’a.”125 The judge held that under the applicable Rome
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations,126 Shari’a
was not a law that could be chosen as applicable law.127 In other words,
regardless of whether Shari’a was “law” in a general sense, it was not law
in the context of conflict of laws.
Exceptions are notable largely because they are so rare. A proposal for
an Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International

EWHC 2118 (Q.B.), no. 37 (“The [lex mercatoria], or general law of merchants . . . is not
the law of a country which is capable of ascertainment by expert evidence from practitioners
in the country”). But see Perry Dane, The Maps of Sovereignty: A Meditation, 12 CARDOZO
L. REV. 959, 974-76, 979-81 (1991).
121. E.g., GOLDMAN , supra note 56, at 13.
122. See Ralf Michaels, Privatautonomie und Privatkodifikation, 62 RABELSZ 580, 620
(1998).
123. See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 28(3),
25 I.L.M. 1302 (1985).
124. Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC v. Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2004) EWCA Civ.
19 [hereinafter Shamil Bank].
125. Id. at no. 1.
126. 1980 O.J. (L 266), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1492.
127. Shamil Bank, supra note 124, at 40, 48. See Kilian Bälz, Islamic Law as
Governing Law under the Rome Convention. Universalist Lex Mercatoria v. Regional
Unification of Law, 6 UNIF. L. REV. 37, 44 (2001).
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Contracts128 would have enabled parties to select non-state law if it came in
a codified form, 129 relying primarily on the UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts.130 However, the proposed provision
was not adopted.13 1 Whether the Principles would be applicable under the
current text appears doubtful132 and also irrelevant because only Mexico and
Venezuela have ratified the Convention.133 More recently, the European
Commission, in its Green Paper on the law applicable to contractual
obligations,134 asked interested parties whether parties to a contract should
be able to select non-state law like lex mercatoria or the UNIDROIT
Principles as the law applicable to their contracts.135 While some
respondents, primarily scholars,136 were in favor of this proposal, 137 no
128. Inter-American Convention of the Law Applicable to International Contracts, 33
I.L.M. 732 (1994) [hereinafter Inter-American Convention].
129. “If the parties have not selected the applicable law, or if this election proves
ineffective, the contract shall be governed by the general principles of international
commercial law accepted by international organizations.” Quoted in Friedrich K. Juenger,
T he Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts: Some
Highlights and Comparisons, 42 AM. J. COMP . L. 383, 391 (1994). For a slightly different
proposal, see Hernany Veytia, The Requirements of Justice and Equity in Contracts, 69 T UL .
L. REV. 1191, 1194 (1995).
130. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW , UNIDROIT
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (2d ed. 2004).
131. Inter-American Convention, supra note 128, at art. 7. For further references, see
Michaels, supra note 122, at 594-95.
132. For analysis, see RUBEN B. SANTOS BELANDRO , EL DERECHO APLICABLE A LOS
C ONTRATOS INTERNACIONALES, 69-74 (1996). See also Friedrich K. Juenger, Contract
Choice of Law in the Americas, 45 AM. J. COMP . L. 195, 204-05 (1997) (arguing that the
final version of the convention allows for the choice of the UNIDROIT principles). The
American delegation with Friedrich Juenger had proposed the applicability. See Juenger,
supra note 129, 391-92.
133. See List of Signatory Countries to the Inter-American Convention of the Law
Applicable to Commercial Cont racts, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/
Sigs/b-56.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
134. Green Paper on the Conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations into a Community Instrument and its Modernization,
COM (2002) 654 final (Jan. 14, 2003).
135. Id. at 22-23.
136. It is not surprising that scholars would support an approach to law that diminishes
the monopoly of the state, and, therefore, has the potential of enhancing scholarly impact on
the law. See Martijn W. Hesselink, The Politics of European Contract Law: Who has an
Interest in What Kind of Contract Law for Europe?, 2 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS, Part 1,
Art. 3, 2-3 (2002); M ARTIJN HESSELINK, T HE NEW EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW , 163, 164-65
(2002).
137. See, e.g., Max-Planck-Institut für Ausländisches und Internationales Privatrecht,
Comments on the European Commission’s Green Paper on the Conversion of the Rome
Convention of 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations into a Community
Instrument and its Modernization, 68 RABELS Z 1, 32-33 (2004). Most responses are
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decision has been taken. However, a newly proposed Regulation would, if
enacted, enable parties to select the UNIDROIT Principles as applicable
law.138
The situation is different within states. Non-state law is recognized and
applied as law within certain countries below the level of state law. For
example, India has different laws of marriage for its Hindu, Muslim, Parsee,
Christian, and Jewish communities.139 Which law applies to any given
marriage depends on the allegiance of the spouses. This is a true
interpersonal conflicts rule based on community affiliation. Here, the old
kind of legal pluralism, state pluralism, is recognized in the conflict of laws.
Such interpersonal conflicts rules are indeed the closest to a system of
conflict of laws that recognizes the norm-making power of non-state
communities. At the same time, these rules exhibit exactly those
characteristics of the old state legal pluralism that the new legal pluralism
tries to disavow. This system only applies within states as a kind of nonterritorial federalism. If a foreign conflic t of laws regime were to address
the validity of a marriage between two Indian Muslims, it would not
directly designate the application of their Muslim law but would instead
designate the application of Indian law, which in turn would designate the
application of Indian Muslim law as applicable. From the outside, all nonstate law is mediated by the state.
B. Incorporation—the Transformation of Non-State Law Into State Law
Even if non-state norms are not applied as law, the state recognizes
them nonetheless, albeit in other ways. First, state law recognizes non-state
law by incorporation. Lex mercatoria may serve as a good example of
incorporation, both in its historic and in its new fashion. Lex mercatoria,
was able to retain its identity because of two important factors, one
institutional and the other substantive. Institutionally, lex mercatoria was
administered by special courts. Substantively, the principles applied by
these special courts were often superior to the English common law because
lex mercatoria was informed by the needs of commerce. Also, these special
courts were international in their bases, having adopted elements from
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/news/consulting_public/rome_i/news_
summary_rome1_en.htm (last visited on Nov. 16, 2005).
138. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law
applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), at Art. 3(2), p. 5, COM (2005) 650 final
(Dec. 15, 2005).
139. For what follows, see DAVID PEARL , INTERPERSONAL CONFLICTS OF
LAWS—IND I A , P A KISTAN AND BANGLADESH (1981); Akolda M. Tier, The Evolution of
Personal Laws in India and the Sudan, 26 J. INDIAN L. INST. 445 (1984).

1232

THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1209

Continental civil law that had eliminated many of the formalities riddling
the English common law.
The English common law reacted by incorporation. Institutionally,
common law courts adopted jurisdiction over lex mercatoria. Substantively,
common law courts incorporated large parts of lex mercatoria into the
common law and thereby avoided competition. The mentioned Pillans
decision140 is not proof for the statement that English courts recognized lex
mercatoria as a separate body of law, but quite the opposite: Lord
Mansfield’s opinion141 made clear that lex mercatoria was not a separate
body of law but part of English law. Incorporation can also be observed in
literature and legislation. For example, Wyndham Beawes’ book on lex
mercatoria was revised and enlarged in its sixth edition by none other than
Joseph Chitty,142 who later set out to write what is now the standard book
on English contract law.143 Similarly, Karl Llewellyn’s draft for the
Uniform Commercial Code took its inspiration, directly and indirectly, from
the medieval lex mercatoria 1 4 4 through adaptation of the German
Commercial Code, which, in turn, had been inspired by commercial
practices and Levin Goldschmidt’s ideas about “immanent law.”145 What
appears to proponents of the autonomy of lex mercatoria to be the state’s
acknowledgment of that autonomy could be viewed equally well as lex
mercatoria’s colonization or enslavement146 by the state’s law. Incorporation
is perfectly compatible with Ehrlich’s insight that the production of law
mainly happens on the periphery, within society.147 Yet the insight loses its
revolutionary potential.
The state is able to domesticate this potentially subversive development
through the incorporation of the norms that are created. It recognizes nonstate communities as generators of norms, but it denies these norms the
140. Pillans, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035.
141. Id.
142. BEAWES, supra note 50.
143. H.H. BEALE , CHITTY ON CONTRACTS (29th ed., 2004). The first edition was
JOSEPH CHITTY , A T REATISE ON THE LAWS OF COMMERCE AND M ANUFACTURES, AND THE
CONTRACTS RELATING T HERETO (1820).
144. Ingrid M. Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn’s Attempt to
Achieve the Good, the True, the Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEO . L. J. 1141, 1148-51
(1984).
145. LEVIN GOLDSCHMIDT, HANDBUCH DES HANDELSRECHTS 302 (3d ed. 1875); KARL
LLEWELLYN , T HE COMMON LAW T RADITION 122 (1960). Cf. James Whitman, Commercial
Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn’s German Sources for the Uniform
Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 156 (1987).
146. I borrow the term from Teubner, De Collisione Discursuum, supra note 26, at 91113.
147. EHRLICH , supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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status of autonomous law. Instead, by incorporating these norms into state
law, the state reiterates its own monopoly on the production of legal
norms.148 By turning implicit law into made law, to use Lon Fuller’s
dichotomy,149 the state can add substance to its otherwise thin and abstract
norms,150 meanwhile denying implicit law’s independent existence. From
this perspective, norms of lex mercatoria are law only insofar as they cease
to be elements of lex mercatoria and become part of the law of the state.
C. Deference—The Transformation of Non-State Law into Facts
Incorporation alone would be insufficient as the state is unable to run
all relevant non-state norms through its own formalized law-making
process. A second means of dealing with non-state norms—again, one
outside of conflict of laws—is deference to such norms as the basis of
private transactions 151 or private ordering.152 Such deference recognizes the
normative autonomy of communities (and even of non-communities) and
protects them from state regulation and interference by granting them a
private space. At the same time, it denigrates the norms created by these
communities to the status of facts for the purpose of legal analysis.153 For
example, the state may leave to commercial practices and professional
standards the development of appropriate standards of care, reasonable
expectations and the like. This is the approach most frequently seen as an
answer to Ehrlich’s “living law.”154 Again, the state does not ignore living
law, but neither does the state recognize it as law. The state’s law does not
conceptualize its own relation to such spaces of private ordering as a
relation to foreign entities and their laws, to be handled by rules of conflict
of laws. Rather, the state refrains from interfering. Put differently, it defers
to the private interactions of individuals. The whole public versus private
distinction takes place not outside but within the framework of the state’s
law. Private ordering enters the substantive law of the state at the time of
enforcement as fact. Customs, expectations, and the like must be taken into
account in applying the state’s laws; but the state does not recognize them
as constituting law in and of themselves.
148. See GOLDMAN , supra note 56, at 13.
149. LON FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW , 70 (1968); cf. Gerald Postema, Implicit Law,
13 L. & PHIL. 361 (1994).
150. FULLER, supra note 149, at 91-110.
151. Cf. Teubner, De Collisione Discursuum, supra note 26, at 918. Teubner, however,
speaks of “externalization.” Id.
152. Schwarcz, supra note 119.
153. Cf. LUHMANN , supra note 24, at 86-88.
154. Ehrlich, supra note 78.
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Far from being irrelevant, the distinction between law and fact is crucial
here. If these practices were recognized as law and designated applicable
law through a choice of law process, then those practices would be on equal
footing with the state’s own law. The state would apply these practices out
of respect for the sovereignty of the norm-creating community, perhaps in
the hope that this community would in turn be willing to apply the state’s
laws as well. If, however, these practices are recognized only as facts, they
are subordinated to the state’s laws and can only fill the space left open by
the state’s laws. The decision to grant such a space does not follow from the
community’s own sovereignty but rather from the state’s determination that
it is appropriate. The state does not assume the need for symmetrical
reciprocity or comity between state and non-state communities because the
state claims the monopoly of force. As a consequence, there is no doubt that
non-state communities must “apply” the state’s norms. So there is no need,
legally speaking, to offer these communities a quid pro quo. Or rather, the
necessary quid pro quo between state and community is not a legal
category; reciprocity between state and non-state communities is
asymmetrical.
D. Delegation—The Transformation of Non-State Law into Subordinated
Law
Incorporation and deference both deny non-state normative orders any
role as an autonomous legality. Incorporation strips such orders of their
autonomy by translating them into the state’s own law. Deference strips
such orders of their legality by treating them as facts. A third operation,
delegation, treats such orders as legal ones separate from the state’s own
law, but still denies them full autonomy. Through the process of delegation,
the state acknowledges the self-regulation of interested groups instead of
regulating them on its own.
Examples of delegation abound: autonomous labor agreements between
unions and employers may have the force of law, codes of conduct of both
regulated and unregulated industries substitute for possible regulation by the
state, and so on. One could even call all contracts delegated law, as does the
French Civil Code (at least nominally) in its famous Article 1134.155 By
raising private contracts to the status of law, French law seems, on the one
hand, most open to recognizing the factual law-making power of non-state
actors through private autonomy. On the other hand, French theorists have
traditionally been most resolute in emphasizing that the binding force of the
155. C. CIV. art. 1134 (1806) (“Agreements legally formed take the place of law for
those who make them.”).

2005] THE CHALLENGE FROM GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM

1235

contract rests entirely on the law.156 Parties may enter into contracts; but
these are enforceable only because the state, through its substantive private
law, explicitly allows them to do so. By recognizing the contract as “law
between the parties,” the state denies the contract the status of law beyond
their privity.
In all these situations, non-state communities produce their own rules
and the state acknowledges them as law but only as law that is subordinate
to state law. Whether delegated norms come into being independently or
whether they are created in response to delegation is irrelevant.157 Entities
or communities may well have created norms prior to, or independently of,
any delegation by the state. The state’s delegation is frequently no more
than the acceptance of a fait accompli. But from the state’s viewpoint, this
does not change the nature of delegation or the subordination of these
norms to those of the state. Rather, from the state’s standpoint, these norms
acquire the status of law from the very moment they are attached and
subordinated to the state and its law. Again, as with incorporation, as soon
as these norms are recognized as law, they lose their autonomous status,
though not as fully as they do in the case of deference. Non-state law turns
into sub-state law.
E. The State’s Legal Monopoly as Self-Immunization
From the state’s point of view, then, non-state norms are recognized in
various ways; but only state law is autonomous law. The norms of non-state
communities become state law through incorporation, or become relevant
facts through deference, or become subordinated law through delegation.
In each case, they are invariably denied the status of autonomous law. The
state thereby maintains its own legal monopoly. Nothing is law unless it is
recognized as such by the state.
Since this emphasis on the state’s legal monopoly may sound extreme,
it is important to understand what it does not imply. First, the distinction
between law and non-law does not rest on an assumed natural priority of the
state over other communities. The state’s monopoly does not exist in some
objective way, as seen by a neutral observer. Such an assumption would be
historically erroneous and factually doubtful today. Non-state communities
with their own normative orders have existed prior to, and independent
156. ROBERT J. POTHIER, A Treatise on Obligations Considered in a Moral and Legal
View 76 (Francois-Xavier Martin trans., The Law Book Exchange, Ltd. 1999) (1802).
157. Somewhat surprisingly, Johnson and Post conceded this point and undermined
their claim for the Internet’s autonomy when they conceived of Internet law as result of state
delegation. See Johnson & Post, supra note 31, at 1394 n.82.
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from, the state. The point is not that such normative orders are secondary
to the state’s law in some abstract or universal way; or that they are, in
actuality, only facts. The point is, rather, that the state conceptualizes them
as such. It is from the perspective of the state and its law that the normative
orders of these non-state communities are secondary normative orders, or
just facts, vis-à-vis the state. A neutral observer may well observe the global
legal pluralism described above, including laws of the state and laws of
non-state communities on an equal footing. The state, from its perspective,
does not.
Second, a legal monopoly is not the same as legal exclusivity. Just
because the state does not recognize non-state orders as law does not mean
that its law is immune from the influence of these orders or that its law
cannot be “responsive law.”158 In fact, the opposite is true. The law of the
state can be responsive precisely because it has developed subtle ways of
dealing with these influences. Incorporation is a direct reaction (through
translation) to non-state normativity. Delegation will be granted only if (and
because) the state is convinced that non-state community self-regulation is
superior to state regulation, typically in reaction to the community’s request
to be allowed to regulate itself. Deference is the acknowledgment that
regulation through state law is contingent on facts, including facts that
individuals can freely determine. In short, the state is able to deny non-state
normative orders the status of “law” precisely because it has other ways to
deal with them. By transforming non-state norms into it own law, into facts,
or into subordinated law, the state can maintain its law-making monopoly
without having to interfere with these norms themselves.
This last point is important for a third point: the state’s monopoly on
law-making does not imply that the state could have unlimited factual
power to regulate all transactions. Globalization demonstrates that this is
untrue and that non-state communities have actual powers that are at times
equal, at times even superior to those of the state. 159 In fact, the array of
operations of acknowledgment may well be regarded not as a sign of
strength, but as one of weakness. Since the state’s power is in fact limited
and since the liberal state must grant spaces of liberty, it cannot avoid the
creation and enforcement of non-state norms; nor does it want to do this.
Therefore, it must find ways to accommodate them. The state can only hope
to maintain its legitimacy and the legitimacy of its lawmaking monopoly if
158. PHILIPPE NONET & PHILLIP SELZNICK , LAW AND SOCIETY IN T RANSITION 73-113
(1978).
159. See, e.g., SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN THE AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION (1996); but see Ralf Michaels, Welche Globalisierung für das Recht?
Welches Recht für die Globalisierung?, 69 RABELSZ 525, 532-33 (2005).
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it gives non-state communities sufficient space for the development and
enforcement of their own norms.
There is a parallel observation: Treating non-state normative orders as
law does not necessarily give them a greater practical importance than
incorporation, deferenc e, or delegation. Put another way, contrary to what
some argue, 160 legal pluralism does not necessarily imply greater autonomy
of non-state communities vis-à-vis the state. The different treatment of law
and non-law is a difference of form, not of degree or substance. States may
well treat foreign laws as law through conflict of law but still deny them
applicability, either because their spec ific approach to conflict of laws
contains a strong preference for the laws of the forum or because that
approach uses a far-reaching public policy exception against foreign law.
On the other hand, a liberal state may well give generous deference and
delegation to non-state normative orders, enabling non-state communities
to regulate their own affairs largely without interventions while denying
them the status of law.
By simultaneously acknowledging non-state norms and denying them
the status of law, the state immunizes itself against non-state norms. It
acknowledges them as different from, not as similar to its own law. This
does not mean, of course, that this is desirable. One may well argue that the
state’s self-immunization is an undesirable response to the challenge of
global legal pluralism or that the state’s attempt to maintain its legitimacy
is doomed to fail. From the viewpoint of the state, however, this may be the
only possible reaction that does not require a dramatic alteration of the state
itself. This is reason enough to examine, in the next section, why the state
reacts the way it does.
IV. T HE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN STATE LAW AND NON-STATE
NORMATIVE ORDERS
A. The Relativism of Choice of Law
Some argue that the restriction of applicable law to state law is
unjustified because non-state normative orders are also “law.” Often, the
argument is a functionalist one—non-state normative orders are
functionally no less “laws” than those of the state, so the state must
recognize them as such. For example, Johnson and Post’s claim for a
“jurisdiction” of the Internet is based on a claim that, functionally, the
Internet is like a state territory.161 Juenger’s argument for applicability of lex
160. See, e.g., DALBERG -LARSEN, supra note 68, at 168-69.
161. Johnson & Post, supra note 31, at 1378-80.
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mercatoria is grounded in the claim that lex mercatoria is a law in all
relevant respects.162
Insofar as the functionalist argument is meant as a logical one, it rests
on a conceptual fallacy. The argument consists in simple syllogism of the
following kind: lex mercatoria is law; conflict of laws designates what law
to apply; thus conflict of laws must also, if all other criteria are met, (e.g.
lex mercatoria has been chosen by the parties) designate lex mercatoria as
applicable law. This syllogism presupposes a uniform definition of “law”
in both premises. Yet even within legal pluralism, different scholars
propose different definitions. Moreover, legal pluralism, legal sociology,
and legal anthropology may well have different definitions of law because
they are interested in different aspects of law. From a sociological or
anthropological perspective, it may (or may not) make sense to refer to all
normative orders in communities as “law.” Yet, this is not necessarily the
legal perspective, intrinsic to operations of the legal system itself.163 The
claim that lex mercatoria is “really” law must be rejected simply bec ause
there is no one reality here. Law is a social construct;164 therefore, the
definition of what law is depends on the criteria used, and these criteria can
easily be different in different disciplines.165
Even if we thought that non-state law should indeed be considered
“law” within legal theory or legal sociology, this would not mean that it
must be law in the sense of conflict of laws. Teubner’s point that “[t]he
debate on [lex mercatoria] is one of the rare cases in which practical legal
decision-making becomes directly dependent upon legal theory”166 is
inexact. Legal theory and conflict of laws may well work with different
notions of “law.” Conflict of laws norms are part of the law of each
individual state; absent treaties, the question of which law applies is
determined, in the last instance, by the state. As a consequence, from the
perspective of state choice of law, what qualifies as “law” is a question for
state law to determine through characterization. This need to characterize
institutions specifically for the purposes of choice of law is nothing new.
162. Friedrich K. Juenger, American Conflicts Scholarship and the New Law Merchant,
28 VA . J. INT’L L. 487, 490-92 (1995).
163. Michaels, supra note 122, at 615; see HANS KELSEN , DER SOZIOLOGISCHE UND
DER J URISTISCHE RECHTSBEGRIFF (1922) and the debate between Ehrlich and Kelsen on the
notion of law in H A N S K E LSEN & EUGEN EHRLICH , RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE UND
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT-EINE KONTROVERSE (1915/17) (2003).
164. Cf. LEOPOLD POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW 39 (1971).
165. Cf. von Benda-Beckmann, supra note 68, at 39-42 (pointing out that different
discourses may need different concepts, and that legal pluralism may not be helpful for
judges).
166. Teubner, Global Bukowina, supra note 18, at 9.
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For example, in order to determine whether a rule in a foreign law must be
considered penal (which would bar its applicability under the so-called
penal rule),167 courts are asked to determine whether the rule is penal in the
international sense rather than in some general sense. 168 Similarly, the
determination of whether rules are substantive, thus governed by the
otherwise applicable law, or procedural, and thus governed by the law of
the forum, is made with regard to the specific requirements of choice of
law.169 In the same way, a state is free to determine whether it will recognize
non-state law as “law” or not. The question is not one of legal theory, but
rather one of construing the relevant conflict of laws rule.
Twining makes a similar point of relativity of position (though not with
the same purpose as here) when he states:
Indeed, the very existence of pluralism depends on standpoint: an
English judge presented with an issue involving a potential clash
between English and Islamic principles may not even perceive or
acknowledge that there is a conflict, let alone accept that Islamic
law is valid “law” in this context, whereas a devout Muslim may
believe that Islamic Law trumps English law.170
Yet, Twining’s formulation is more psychological than analytical.
Twining focuses on different modes of thought between the “English judge”
and the “devout Muslim,” rather than on the different normative systems for
whose standpoints the question must be answered. This does not fully grasp
the relativity involved. After all, the English judge may well be a devout
Muslim herself and still have to face the same conflict. As an English judge,
she will have to hold that Shari’a is not law, at least in the positivistic sense
of the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations.171 As
a Muslim, on the other hand, she may recognize Muslim law not only as
“law” but as a law higher than English law. Neither of the two is a global,
universal position. In this sense, neither position is “correct” in the way a
scientific analysis may aim at being correct. The difference in perspective
then is not that of different individuals but that of different reference
systems. Importantly, these are not different substantive law reference
167. SCOLES, supra note 3, at 145-47.
168. See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E. 198, 198-99 (N.Y. 1918).
169. WALTER WHEELER COOK , T HE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS, ch. 6 (1942); Grant v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944, 946-49 (Cal. 1953).
170. Twining, supra note 68, at 250. Here, Twining refers to Islamic Law as non-state
law as opposed to the national codifications, or incorporations, of Shari’a in various
countries.
171. Shamil Bank, supra note 124.
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systems (the everyday topic that is dealt with by conflict of laws) but rather
different conflict of laws reference systems: one of state law vis-à-vis nonstate law and the other of non-state law vis-à-vis state law.
B. The Special Treatment of Foreign State Law
Is the law of foreign states treated differently? Some have indeed argue
proposed that conflict of laws in its treatment of foreign laws does not
function any differently from the three operations of incorporation,
deference, and delegation. All three operations are found in discussions
about the nature of choice of law, as different attempts to overcome the
assumption that all foreign law must simply be rejected, not because it is
not law, but because it is foreign. The idea of incorporation can be found in
the so-called local law theory, advocated by Walter Wheeler Cook. Cook
argues that a judge always applies local law; but in interstate cases, this
local law may replicate the content of foreign law.172 Incorporation is found
also in Roberto Ago’s theory of naturalization—that the state creates special
substantive norms for international cases and these special norms naturalize
or incorporate foreign legal norms.173 Likewise, the concept of deference
exists in the conflict of laws. Foreign law is still sometimes regarded as
mere fact, especially for the purpose of proving foreign law.174 Some
theories even construe foreign law as fact in general, most notably
Ehrenzweig in his idea to treat foreign law as “datum” in a judicial
decision.175 Finally, while no explicit theory of delegation as a basis of
conflict of laws exists, one could well regard the functioning of the
traditional choice of law rule as such: foreign law is “law” if and only to the
extent that domestic law, through its choice of law rules, delegates lawmaking authority (vis-à-vis domestic courts) to the foreign lawmaker. Thus,
the choice of law rule would function as a quasi-Hartian rule of
recognition.176
Yet all of these theories have had fairly little influence on the theory
and practice of conflict of laws. Generally, foreign law is applied as law. If
it is not applied, the reason is not that it is not “law” but rather that it is not
the applicable law. In other words, while it would be possible to

172. COOK , supra note 169, at 20-21.
173. ROBERTO AGO , RÈGLES DES CONFLITS DE LOIS, 1936-IV Rec. des Cours 302-08.
174. SCOLES, supra note 3, 543-45. For critique, see Jansen & Michaels, supra note
118, at 13-14.
175. See SCOLES, supra note 3, at 38-43.
176. Cf. Teubner, Breaking Frames, supra note 21, at 153 (quoting M ICHEL VAN DE
KERCHOVE & FRANÇOIS OST, LE DROIT OU LES PARADOXES DU JEU 179 (1992)).

2005] THE CHALLENGE FROM GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM

1241

conceptualize the application of foreign law as incorporation, deference, or
delegation, this is not the normal conceptualization. The underlying
assumption is that the quality of foreign state law as law neither depends on
nor commands the theory of its applicability.
C. Jurispersuasion and the State
This different treatment of foreign laws and of non-state norms leads to
a puzzle. If, indeed, the state claims legal supremacy, why would it treat any
normative order other than its own as “law?” Yet this is exactly what
happens with foreign laws in the choice of law process. Why would the
state—with its claim to a legal monopoly—treat the laws of foreign states
as laws in the conflict of laws process and only deny non-state normative
orders similar dignity? Why would the state use the instruments of
incorporation, deference, and delegation towards non-state normative orders
but not towards foreign law?
These questions do not yield obvious answers. For purposes of choice
of law, the question of whether non-state normative orders are “law” is
answered from the position of each specific state and its law. This does not
explain why the state answers the way it does. Nor is it enough to point out
that the state uses a simple formal criterion like “state-based norms” to
distinguish law from other normative orders, because the discipline of
conflict of laws, at least in the United States, has moved away from the
rigorous formalism of the First Restatement and has adopted an openly
functionalist approach.177 Why, then, is this functional approach not
universally extended to the question of what normative orders can be
recognized as “law?” Why do we not at least find some states that do and
some states that do not recognize non-state orders as “law?”
These questions lead us to the core of the problem. Legal pluralists
argue that the state should be willing, at least prima facie, to enforce the
decisions and laws of such communities, just as the state already enforces
decisions of foreign states’ courts and the laws of foreign states.178 Such
enforcement does not follow automatically from the nature of “law,”
because what matters for choice of law is not an ontological definition of
law, but rather, the determination of what is law from the perspective of the
state and its choice of law norms. This makes it plausible to develop a
discursive criterion for this determination of law. Such a criterion is

177. See SCOLES, supra note 3, at 18-105.
178. Cf. Berman, Globalization of Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 511-12; Berman, Law
and Globalization, supra note 5, at 534.
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Berman’s “jurispersuasion.”179 His argument is that communities that want
their norms and their decisions to be enforced by states (even if these norms
diverge from those of the states) must convince the states of their status as
law-creating and autonomous. 180 This argument for recognizing non-state
law is indeed one of definition: since non-state normative orders are “law”
in a theoretical sense, they must also be “law” in the sense of conflict of
laws. However, this is only part of the argument. In addition, the argument
is discursive: non-state law is “law” only because and insofar as the nonstate community can convince the state that it is.
Why should states be convinced? Do states have a governmental
interest in such an application? While not addressing this question directly,
Berman makes arguments for a multilateral approach to choice of law
between state laws that could be translated into the context of legal
pluralism:
[A] cosmopolitan approach is firmly grounded in an expanded
notion of governmental interests. Indeed, as courts consider
multiple community affiliations and develop hybrid rules for
resolving multistate disputes, they do so not because they are
ignoring the policy choices of their home state, but because they
are effectuating their state’s broader interest in taking part in a
global community. Thus, a cosmopolitan approach is ultimately
moored to an expanded conception of how governments must
operate in an interconnected world.181
If, according to global legal pluralism, this interconnected global
community is made up of both states and non-state communities, one might
well argue that participants in the global community must be ready to apply
179. Berman, Law and Globalization, supra note 5, at 534. Jurispersuasion is
reminiscent, as a concept, of the “new sovereignty” introduced by Abram and Antonia
Chayes as the “connection to the rest of the world and the ability to be a political actor in
it.” See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA CHAYES, T HE NEW SOVEREIGNTY : COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 26 (1995).
180. Berman, Law and Globalization, supra note 5, at 534.
181. Berman, Cosmopolitan Vision, supra note 5, at 1864-65; cf. id. at 1867 (“[T]he
long-term interests that states have in being part of an interlocking world order.”).
[C]onflicts rules based on parochial preferences for forum law are apt to turn into
legal imperialism unless one’s idea of a government’s self-interest expands to
include an interest in being a cooperating member of the global community. . .
Because states are inevitably embedded in an international system, they
internalize the aspirations and disciplining norms of that international system and
have an important interest in being a cooperative member of a global community.
Id. at 1880-81.
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the norms made by non-state communities.
The argument (which may not be Berman’s) is intriguing. However, it
rests on the assumption that states have an interest in recognizing non-state
normative orders as law; and this may be unlikely. First, the state’s interest
in taking part in a global community may not translate easily from a world
of states and their laws to a world of global legal pluralism. Berman uses a
popular argument to rebut the idea that it is always in a state’s interest to
apply its own law:182 All states will be better off if they are occasionally
willing to defer to each other’s law.183 This argument indeed supports a
more multilateral approach to the conflict of laws, insofar as it relates to
states;184 but it would not apply as well to the relation between states and
non-states. States, as the “community of nations,” have a collective interest
in maintaining their cartel of law-making and law administration and of not
admitting outsiders into their cartel. Multilateralism, positive comity,
reciprocal deference, all represent enlightened governmental interests of
each state precisely because they empower states vis-à-vis non-states. It
may not be a coincidence that globalization has spurred both more “positive
comity” between governmental entities 185 and simultaneously attempts of
the state to restrict the influence of individuals in litigation.186
Multilateralism is indeed brought about by globalization; but it may be a
reaction against, not an adoption of, globalization and legal pluralism. It
may be the states’ collective attempt to fight off the challenges from nonstate communities.187
A similar point can be made regarding jurispersuasion. It is possible to
argue that non-communities must be allowed to convince states of their
status as communities, just as foreign nations must somehow convince the
state in which enforcement is sought that they are entitled to assert
jurisdiction. Yet, the test applied in traditional U.S. conflict of laws suggests
why non-state communities face a hard time succeeding in such
jurispersuasion. Normally, judgments from foreign nations are enforceable
182. Id. at 1850-51. See ROBERT KEOHANE , AFTER HEGEMONY : COOPERATION AND
DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984) (stating a parallel argument from
international relations); LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 181-93 (2d ed.1995) (adapting
the international relations argument to choice of law).
183. Berman, Cosmopolitan Vision, supra note 5, at 1850-51.
184. See id. at 1821, passim (stating the main focus of Berman’s article on a
Cosmopolitan Vision); Perez, supra note 88 (stating that the assumption that people are
members of various overlapping communities seems irrelevant for this claim).
185. ANNE -M ARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 30 (2003).
186. See, e.g., F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 170-71
(arguing for broader jurisdiction over governmental than over private actions).
187. Cf. Dane, supra note 120, at 985-86.
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in U.S. courts , without relitigation of the merits; but they are not enforced
if the foreign court did not have jurisdiction. 188 Whether the foreign court
had jurisdiction is determined not only by its own law as a requirement for
a valid judgment but also according to standards of the enforcing court. The
decision of a foreign court will not be recognized and enforced unless a
U.S. court, under similar circumstances, would have had jurisdiction as
well. This means, for example, that foreign judgments based on exorbitant
bases of jurisdiction, like the presence of assets unrelated to the litigation
or the nationality of the plaintiff,189 will not be recognized. The reason is
not, however, that these bases are “exorbitant” by any universal
standard—this would be neither necessary (because no such universal
standard exists)190 nor sufficient. Rather, the reason is that these bases are
“exorbitant” as against the standard of the enforcing country. States accept
the “jurispersuasion” of foreign countries only if their claim to jurisdiction
is equivalent to the claims of the enforcing state.
This suggests why jurispersuasion works between states but not
between states and non-state communities. Foreign states have at least a
prima facie claim to enforcement because their jurisdiction is structurally
similar to that of the enforcing state. Non-state communities, on the other
hand, would not only have to argue that they are, as communities, entitled
to assert jurisdiction in a sociological sense. In addition, they would have
to argue that the jurisdiction they assert is, by nature, similar to the
jurisdiction of courts in the enforcing state. Yet, since one criterion from the
state’s perspective is that jurisdiction, as opposed to private ordering, exists
only in the state, such an argument cannot succeed. The state accepts
jurispersuasion, but it accepts it only from other states.
D. Living Law and State Positivism in Choice of Law
What is it about the state then that makes the recognition of non-state
law as law so difficult? In order to answer this question, it may help to look
188. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
189. See Kevin M. Clermont & John R.B. Palmer, Exorbitant Jurisdiction, 58 M E . L.
REV. (forthcoming 2006) (providing a recent analysis and critique of exorbitant bases of
jurisdiction in the United States and in France).
190. Negotiations towards a Worldwide Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, trying to ban
certain jurisdictional bases worldwide, ended in the adoption of a Convention with a much
reduced scope, focusing only on choice of court agreements. See Convention on Choice of
Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=
conventions.text&cid=98. But see Clermont & Palmer, supra note 189 (arguing that there
is a common core of abhorred jurisdictional bases).

2005] THE CHALLENGE FROM GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM

1245

again to one of the founding fathers of legal pluralism, Eugen Ehrlich—the
same Ehrlich who was influential for Teubner’s conception of legal
pluralism. Shortly before publishing his treatise on legal sociology, at
exactly the time he was developing ideas about the origin of law in society
rather than in the state, 191 Ehrlich published an article, since forgotten, about
conflict of laws . 192 In its second half, this article enthusiastically reviews
Zitelmann’s treatise on private international law.193 Its first half contains a
history of private international law from antiquity to Ehrlich’s own time. 194
In the course of this history, Ehrlich accounts for tribal laws in Germanic
times, when the applicable law was determined with reference to each
individual’s tribal allegiance195—an early example of non-state jurisdiction
and its relevance in the conflict of laws. For his own time, however, Ehrlich
does not propose to expand conflict of laws to non-state communities
because of “our modern conception, for which law is primarily an
expression of the state’s will, and the judge an agent of the state”:196
This must of course affect private international law. Today, as a
matter of course, only the state determines which law should apply
in its boundaries. And the judge must no longer search for the law,
which is enacted for the respective case; he must, as an agent of the
state, apply the law that the state orders him to apply. If one speaks
today of a national law, this is more and more not understood to
191. Eugen Ehrlich, Soziologie und Jurisprudenz (1903), reprinted in GESETZ UND
VERMISCHTE KLEINERE SCHRIFTEN (Manfred Rehbinder ed., 1986); see
Eugen Ehrlich, Freie Rechtsfindung und freie Rechtswissenschaft (1903), reprinted in 9
M ODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES 70 (1917).
192. Eugen Ehrlich, Internationales Privatrecht, 126 DEUTSCHE RUNDSCHAU 419
(1906).
193. ERNST Z ITELMANN, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT (1897). Zitelmann’s theory
of private international law has recently been proposed as a model for conflict of laws in
globalization, unfortunately without mention of Ehrlich’s article. See Thomas Decker, Das
Kollisionsrechtliche Werk Ernst Zitelmanns (1852-1923)—Ein Konzept für die zukünftige
Gestaltung des Internationalen Privatrechts? (2004), available at http://elib.ub.uniosnabrueck.de/publications/diss/E-Diss381_thesis.pdf. (last visited Oct. 15, 2005).
Zitelmann and Ehrlich had both developed ideas of a world law; see Eugen Ehrlich, Die
Zukunft des Römischen Rechtsunterrichts in Österreich, 6 ÖSTERREICHISCHE RUNDSCHAU
386 (1906); ERNST Z ITELMANN, ÜBER DIE M ÖGLICHKEITEN EINES WELTRECH T S 43
(1888/1916).
194. Ehrlich, supra note 192, at 419-28.
195. Simeon L. Guterman, The Principle of the Personality of Law in the Early Middle
Ages: A Chapter in the Evolution of Western Legal Institutions and Ideas, 21 U. M IAMI L.
REV. 259 (1966).
196. Ehrlich, supra note 192, at 425 (“Unsre moderne Vorstellung, für die das Recht
vor allem ein Ausdruck des staatlichen Willens, des Richter ein staalicher Bestellter ist....”).
LEBENDES R ECHT.
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mean the law of a people, as a community held together by origin,
language, history and culture, but the law of a state, as a
governmental organization resting on a specific territory, which can
either extend over a number of peoples, or only comprehend parts
or particles of a people. And this state now orders that everyone
and everything which is situated in its territory be subject to its law;
only what it cannot reach with all its instruments of power eludes
its law in fact197. . . . The question of private international law is
now reduced to this: which law does the state order to apply in each
individual case. 198
The quote contrasts starkly with Ehrlich’s own idea of a “living law.”199
Apparently, Ehrlich postulates the “living law”is born within communities
only as a concept for legal sociology and as a source of inspiration for the
legislator and the judge in domestic cases, not for private international law.
Of course, one may argue that Ehrlich is only paying homage to the
thinking of his time—once “living law” is recognized to be the law, he
might argue for a change in the state’s conflict of laws rules. Yet this is not
so certain. Ehrlich makes clear that there is a connection between where
conflict of law rules originate on the one hand and what counts as law on
the other, between the designating and the designated normative system:
“[W]hat matters for today’s private international law are the concepts of law
and state that govern today.”200 In other words, since the state has the
197. Ehrlich, Internationales Privatrecht, supra note ___, at 425.
(“Das muß selbstverständlich auch auf das internationale Privatrecht
zurückwirken. Jetzt ist es selbstverständlich nur der Staat, der bestimmt, welches
Recht in seinen Gemarkungen gelten solle. Und der Richter hat nicht mehr nach
dem Rechte zu suchen, das für den in Betracht kommenden Fall gegeben ist; er
hat, ein Beauftragter des Staates, das Recht anzuwenden, das der Staat ihm
anzuwenden befiehlt. Wenn jetzt von einem nationalen Recht die Rede ist, so
versteht man darunter immer mehr nicht das Recht eines Volks, als einer durch
Abkunft,Sprache, Geschichteund Kultur verbundenen Gemeinschaft, sondern das
Recht eines Staates, als einer auf einem bestimmten Gebiet ruhenden
Herrschaftsorganisation, die sich sowohl über eine Mehrheit von Völkern
erstrecken, als auch nur Teile oder Teilchen eines Volks umfassen kann. Und
dieser Staat spricht es nun an, daß jeder und alles, was sich auf seinem Gebiete
befindet, sich seinem Rechte unterwerfe; seinem Recht ist an sich nur das
entzogen, worauf er mit all seinen Machtmitteln nicht greifen kann.”).
198. Id. at 426 (“Die internationale privatrechtliche Frage löst sich also jetzt ganz in
die Frage auf: welches Recht befiehlt der Staat in jedem einzelnen Falle anzuwenden”).
199. See EHRLICH , supra note 77 and accompanying text.
200. Ehrlich, supra note 192, at 431 (“Aber für das heutige internationale Privatrecht
kommt es auf die Vorstellungen an, die heute über Staat und Recht herrschen. . .”),
(emphasis in original). Cf. Dane, supra note 120, at 979.
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monopoly over the creation of conflict of laws norms, it has the monopoly
over the creation of substantive law norms and vice versa. The state uses its
monopoly over choice of law rules to order the application of only state law
because the state has the exclusive power to make laws—not in a
sociological sense but in the understanding of the state that sets these rules.
What is so special about the state for conflict of laws? Is the state not
just one among many types of communities? Is the state somehow more real
than other associations? Does it have more legitimacy? In one way, the
obvious answer is no. The state is an “imagined community” like other
imagined communities.201 There is nothing natural about the state. The state,
at least in its modern form, is the fruit of a certain time; and it may decline
again.202 Proponents of legal pluralism have asserted this point in arguing
against confining the status of law to state law. Once the state no longer
serves as the formal criterion distinguishing law from non-law, no other
criterion seems to do the job. If the state is not special, one might argue that
neither is its normative order, state law. If we think of law as something not
contingent on a specific kind of community, then there seems to be no
reason to bind it to the state.
In another way, however, the answer is not so easy. First, it is not
enough to grant that the state, as its own imagined community, is actually
as real as other communities. 2 0 3 Once we move from actual hard facts or
external observations to imagination, we cannot stop arbitrarily at the thin
criterion of “community” that states and non-states share. Imagination not
only creates both states and non-states as communities, it also creates the
special role that the state adopts amongst all these various communities. As
Justin Rosenberg puts it, “[T]he apparent correspondence of ideas of empty
space and time to the properties of a pre-social natural universe does not
change the fact that those ideas too are ‘full’ of social and cultural
determinations.”204 In this sense, the exclusivity of the state as the only
relevant community is likewise real, even if only as “imagined,” as a social
construct.205 This means not only that the state “is still a particularly
201. Berman, Globalization of Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 320, 462-72 (citing
BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD
OF N ATIONALISM (1991)).
202. M ARTIN VAN CREVELD, T HE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE STATE (1999); WOLFGANG
R E I N H A R D , G E S C H I C H T E D E R ST A A T S G E W A L T : E I N E V E R G L E I C H E N D E
VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE EUROPAS VON DEN ANFÄNGEN BIS ZUR GEGENWART 15 (1999).
203. Berman, Globalization of Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 496.
204. JUSTIN ROSENBERG , T HE FOLLIES OF GLOBALISATION T HEORY : POLEMICAL
ESSAYS 6 (2000).
205. SANTOS, supra note 7, at 438 (“In a polycentric legal world, the centrality of the
state law, though increasingly shaken, is still a decisive political factor. But above all, it is
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powerful imagined community and one that generates real feelings of
loyalty and attachment,”206 but that people frequently imagine it as the only
community entitled to make law. Once one looks not at objective criteria for
the definition of the state but rather at people’s perceptions, then that
perception that the state has a special role among the various imagined
communities becomes relevant for our assessment of its status.
In this context, it is again important to see that recognizing the lawmaking power of other states does not weaken the state’s position but
strengthens it. The mutual recognition of states and the mutual enforcement
of each other’s laws enable states to stand more steadfastly above individual
parties and non-state communities. Through conflict of laws, states
mutually constitute each other as law-makers. The relation between the state
and non-state communities is necessarily different. It is not a relation of
mutual delimitation of spaces to engage in structurally similar ac tivities like
legislation, enforcement, or adjudication, but a delimitation of public and
private spaces respectively. It is not a relation of segmentary differentiation,
as that between states, but one of functional differentiation between the
public and the private sphere. While state and society mutually constitute
each other, they constitute each other as state and society respectively, not
as lawmakers.
A state’s obligation to recognize non-state law as law would therefore
have to come from a reference system external to the state, from a
universalistic position. Indeed, Berman, at times, seems to adopt such a
position when he considers a natural law of jurisdiction,207 arguing that “we
could adopt a choice-of-law rule that takes the perspective not of an
individual state but of the entire global legal system, and then try to resolve
the choice-of-law question,”208 and posits that not all governmental interests
may be legitimate from Currie’s perspective of governmental interest
analysis.209 Similarly, Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, in postulating “a form
of conflicts law that is not based on the determination of one territorial law
which has the closest relation to the conflict, but which seeks instead to
identify the functional regime to which the legal issue in question
belongs,”210 appears to take such a universalistic position.
Leaving aside for a moment the question of whether such a
reproduced by multiple mechanisms of acculturation and socialization.”); Dane, supra note
120, at 963 (“Modern States are not like other communities. No amount of talk will change
that.”).
206. Berman, Globalization of Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 496.
207. Id. at 493 (citing Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 92, at 58).
208. Berman, Cosmopolitan Vision, supra note 5, at 1851.
209. Id. at 1852.
210. Teubner & Fischer-Lescano, supra note 5, at 1021.
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universalistic position would be desirable, the state, from its perspective,
will likely reject both claims. Since it has overcome its grounding in
international law, the perspective of conflict of laws is the perspective of an
individual state, not that of the entire global legal system or even the entire
world society. And from the state’s perspective, every interest that a state
has is by definition a legitimate from a governmental interest analysis
because the state has no other standard of legitimacy. Even Anne-Marie
Slaughter, otherwise a strong proponent of cosmopolitanism, admits that “it
is still a leap, however, from the point that U.S. government representatives,
in every branch, must take account of international events, trends, and
interests to represent their constituents adequately to the argument that they
should also see themselves as representing a larger transnational or even
global constituency.”211 From a global perspective, one may see a
sociological “conflict” of laws that has the characteristics Fischer-Lescano
and Teubner ascribe to it. From the perspective of the state as master over
conflict of laws norms, this is not the case.
All of this suggests that states could in theory accept non-state law as
“law” through a conflict of laws process, but that there are political reasons
why they likely will not. By their very nature, states likely will continue
what they do now: incorporate, defer to, or delegate normative orders, but
not accept them as law. This may seem narrow-minded or blind. Yet this
blindness is the consequence of the blind spot in the conception of the state.
The state maintains its ability to decide conflicts between diverging factions
only insofar as it can transcend these factions, as it ignores different
communities’ claims for normative authority and reduces their jurisdictional
claims to mere positions of parties before the law. If the state treated all
communities as its equals, it could no longer assume this transcendent
position. Just as states cannot sit in judgment over other states in
international law, such states could no longer sit in judgment over disputes
between non-state communities. When all positions become communities,212
all substantive law turns completely into conflict of laws. Legal pluralism
would lead to the end of substantive law as we know it.213
21 1 . SL A U G H T E R, supra note 185, at 233-34. Slaughter justifies the leap with the
suggestion that it is necessary “to avoid global government.” Id. at 234. But world
government and cosmopolitanism are hardly the two only possible developments.
212. For an extreme example, see Melissaris, supra note 92, at 75 (“Only when the
legal commitment of clubbers who queue patiently at a bouncer’s orders is treated as
seriously as the legal commitment of communities with religious or other moral bonds will
the pluralistic study of the law be able to move away from the essentially positivistic
external study of groups to the study of legal discourses”).
213. Cf. Dane, supra note 120, at 991 (“An unlimited account of non-state sovereignty
might require the state to dissolve.”).
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V. PLURALIZATION OF THE STATE
This quite elaborate argument demonstrates why the state does not
normally recognize non-state normative orders as law. The state cannot
recognize non-state law as law and at the same time maintain the same
concept of itself. The normative order designated by the choice of law rules
is always, it turns out, a reflection of the normative order encompassing the
choice of law rules. The laws of foreign states may be applied as law
because these laws are structurally similar to the state’s own laws for states
are structurally similar. Other normative orders cannot be so applied
without a reconceptualization of the state itself.
States may have no interest in such a development. Yet the state is only
a social construct; the interests assigned to it are only metaphorical. The real
normative question is not, of course, what the state wants, but what the
world community wants. The answer requires a move away from a
descriptive to a prospective perspective: What would happen if the state
accepted the challenge from pluralism?
A. The Proliferation of Conflicts
A first consequence would be the proliferation of conflicts of laws.214
Legal pluralism leads not only to bilateral conflicts between state law and
non-state law but also to conflicts between different non-state orders. A
pluralist concept of conflict of laws will therefore lead to more conflicts.
Take the famous example of the cases generated when Yahoo users offered
Nazi paraphernalia on Yahoo’s auction site. A French court ordered Yahoo
to make offers unavailable to users in France, and a California district court
declared the judgment unenforceable in California. 215 Berman convincingly
214. On conflicts between non-official laws as an underappreciated phenomenon of
legal pluralism, see Masaji Chiba, Other Phases of Legal Pluralism in the Contemporary
World, 11 RATIO JURIS 228, 229, 230, 234-38 (1998).
215. Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris,
May 22 & Nov. 20, 2000; Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisémitisme,
169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 379 F.3d 1120, 1132 (9th
Cir. 2004), reh’g en banc granted, 399 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2005); rev’d 433 F.3d 1199 (9th
Cir. 2006).
An irony of this now famous case is that the substantive decision in France, namely that
a web site provider could be liable for the Nazi paraphernalia offered on its site, may well
be moot. In April 2005, the Cour d’appel de Paris upheld an earlier decision, acquitting
Yahoo’s former president of essentially the same charges that were brought against Yahoo!,
because the provider of an auction site could not violate the relevant Article of the French
Criminal Code. Association ‹Anciens Déportés ‹Auschwitz et Mouvement Contre Le
Racisme et ´ Antisémitisme v. Koogle (Cour d’ appel, Paris), 10 ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
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regards the French assertion of jurisdiction as justifiable and suggests strong
reasons for a U.S. court to recognize the French decision.216 If Americans
criticize the French assertion of jurisdiction as extraterritorial, they forget
that denying the French jurisdiction leads to a similarly extraterritorial
application, in this case extraterritorial application of the First Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution.217 Yet the recognition of an existing conflict does
little to solve it. Worse, legal pluralism makes the problem even bigger
because now the conflict is not only one between the French and the
American or Californian community. Numerous other overlapping
communities are involved as well: the community of bidders in internet
auctions, the csommunity of survivors of the Holocaust, the community of
opponents of Holocaust denial, the community of free speech advocates, the
community of collectors of Nazi paraphernalia, etc. All these communities
have a prima facie claim to asserting jurisdiction over the Yahoo case, and
the norms they would wish to be applied are hardly all the same.
The chance for conflict between communities is greater than between
states for another reason. States are all relatively heterogenous internally.
They formulate their policies, at least in democracies, through some process
of internal interest balancing. This tends to lead to large degree of similarity
between the laws of different states. Non-state communities, on the other
hand, will often be relatively homogenous internally. This homogeneity
provides a good argument to leave the regulation of their own internal
affairs to themselves—something the state can do through deference and
delegation. However, insofar as conflicts between communities are at stake,
the claim of communities to “jurisdiction” is not different from the
formulated policy of a business association; and their efforts at “persuasion”
do not differ from political lobbying by interest groups.218 The need for each
state to mediate “internal” conflicts in the creation of its norms reduces the
AND LAW REPORT 384 (2005).

Had Yahoo! appealed the decision in France, instead of going
right to the Californian courts, it might well have reached an acquittal as well.
216. Berman, Cosmopolitan Vision, supra note 5, at 1878; but see Joel R. Reidenberg,
Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, 153 U. PENN . L. REV. 1951, 1959 (2005).
217. Ralf Michaels, Territorial Jurisdiction after Territoriality, in GLOBALISATION AND
JURISDICTION 105, 118 (Piet Jan Slot & Mielle Bulterman eds., 2004); Berman,
Cosmopolitan Vision, supra note 5, at 1836, 1877. Some authors argue that U.S. law should
prevail because the First Amendment, as Constitutional law, is superior to a mere French
statute. See Ayelet Ben-Ezer & Ariel L. Bendor, Conceptualizing Yahoo! v. L.C.R.A.:
Private Law, Constitutional Review, and International Conflict of Laws, 25 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2089, 2135-36 (2004). However, such a transnational hierarchy does not exist. The
U.S. Constitution is superior qua Constitution only to U.S. statutory law, and French
statutory law is inferior qua statutory law only to the French Constitution.
218. Of course, foreign nations also engage in lobbying. The difference is that lobbying
is not the only path available for foreign nations.
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number of conflicts between the norms of different states. Non-state
communities have fewer such needs and will therefore diverge more
frequently from others.
B. The Violence of Conflicts
Thus, the more lawmakers there are, the more conflicts will arise.
Ironically, this makes the position of the state as decision maker more
crucial. Does legal pluralism at least lead to more peaceful resolutions of
such conflicts, because the recognition of other lawmaking communities
forces greater deference to their decisions? Proponents of legal pluralism
often support pluralism as a peaceful alternative to the violence of the
state. 219 This idea is obviously influenced by the colonial origins of the
concept of legal pluralism—the encounter of a repressive Western legal
system and a repressed local law mediated by pluralism.220 Pluralism, in
avoiding repressions, seems more peaceful. Yet in globalization, this hope
may well be turned on its head.
One somewhat counterintuitive illustration of this is the war on terror.
What does it have to do with conflict of laws? 2 2 1 The U.S. administration
continually justifies its actions in legal terms, continually emphasizing its
right to self-defense, the legality of its actions.222 If the U.S. asserts a right
to go to war against Afghanistan and Iraq without express authorization by
an international law institution (the U.N. Security Council or the
International Court of Justice), this presumes the assertion of jurisdiction to
determine the existence of such rights. In fact, the statement can be
reconceptualized from a conflict of laws perspective. First the U.S. asserts
jurisdiction to determine the existence of a right to preemptive self-defense.
The basis may well be the effects of terrorism on the U.S., effects being one
generally accepted basis for jurisdiction.223 Then, in a choice-of-law
analysis, the U.S. determines an unspecified body of quasi-natural law
granting such a right in opposition to traditional public international law to
be applicable. 224 Finally, the U.S. enforces its own decision with military
219. M ARY KALDOR, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY : AN ANSWER TO WAR (2003).
220. ANTONY ANGHIE , IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY A N D T H E M AKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
221. Diane Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA . L. REV. 2085, 2104-06, 2115-16 (2005).
222. Michael Byers, Preemptive Self-defense: Hegemony, Equality and Strategies of
Legal Change, 11 J. OF POL . PHI. 171 (2003); Fleur Johns, Guantànamo Bay and the
Annihilation of the Exception, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 613 (2005).
223. Another possible basis is the protective principle. See Vaughan Lowe,
Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 329, 342 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2003).
224. The International Court of Justice has, in a lengthy obiter dictum, rejected the U.S.
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power.225 Of course, in the case of Iraq, the U.S., unlike non-state
communities, does not require jurispersuasion in order to convince other
states to enforce its jurisdiction. It can do so on its own.
All of this may be considered appropriate or inappropriate; and legal
pluralism will not help in the assessment because, as an analytical concept,
it has no inherent normative value. 226 Yet it must not be forgotten that, from
a pluralist perspective, the United States is not the only community
asserting jurisdiction in this war. Saddam Hussein’s insistence on the
sovereignty of Iraq—in itself an insistence on jurisdiction to determine what
is best for Iraq—had to be disregarded in the course of the war, whether
rightly or wrongly. Worse, terrorist groups in Iraq similarly assert their
power over Western captives in ways that could be seen as law-like. They
assert “jurisdiction” based on these Westerner’s presence in Iraq as
members of, or at least in connection with, the occupying forces, or based
on their nationality. They then convict them and enforce their “judgments”
in the manner they see fit: a video-taped beheading. Should we grant these
terrorist groups the prima facie status of a community with its own
jurisdiction? Berman acknowledges that “some communities may embrace
norms that many would find undesirable”227 but does not find a great
problem because “in order for the legal norms of a non-state community to
be enforced, such norms must be adopted by those with coercive power and
abhorrent assertions of jurisdiction are unlikely to achieve widespread
acceptance. ”228 This is of little help where these communities enforce their
decisions on their own. More importantly, from the perspective of theory,
it is not clear whether the issue is jurisdiction at all. What exactly is
abhorrent here—the assertion of jurisdiction by these communities or the
outcome of the assertion? Do we deny these groups the right to make and
administer law altogether, or do we deny recognition only to the results of
its exercise? Is our rejection of their decisions based on their lack of
jurisdiction, or merely on a public policy exception? Since terrorist groups
claim to a right of preemptive self-defense, as invoked for the Iraq war. Case Concerning
Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Reports,
paras 37-78 (Nov. 6). For possible justifications for the Afghanistan war, see Michael Byers,
Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law after 11 September, 51 INT’L & COMP .
L.Q. 401 (2002).
225. See Goldsmith, supra note 34, at 1216 n. 74 (citing United States v Noriega, 746
F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla 1990) (discussing military invasion as a method of extraterritorial
enforcement)).
226. Woodman, supra note 68, at 48; SANTOS, supra note 7, at 90; Koskenniemi, supra
note 84, at 16-17.
227. Berman, Globalization of Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 511.
228. Id.; Berman, Law and Globalization, supra note 5, at 538.
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are undoubtedly communities, it seems that cosmopolitans would have to
go the latter way.229 It is doubtful whether a theory that must put so much
emphasis on the public policy exception is more apt to deal with the
challenges of legal pluralism than traditional conflict of laws. Many of the
non-state legal orders embraced (necessarily) by legal pluralism are deeply
unjust. Little seems to be gained if courts recognize their jurisdiction only
to deny recognition to the results of their asserting that jurisdiction.
This glance at abhorred non-state communities opens the view to
another, perhaps unwelcome, consequence of cosmopolitan conflict of laws.
Raising non-state communities to the level of the state as law-making
bodies necessarily implies reducing the state to the same level as non-state
communities. If the jurisdiction of non-state communities can be recognized
when they succeed in jurispersuasion, it seems plausible that states may
deny jurisdiction for states that fail in jurispersuasion. So far, the prima
facie jurisdiction of states is recognized, regardless of whether they are
democratic or not. But why, in a cosmopolitan pluralist conception, should
we do this? Why should we not deny states with non-representative
governments their jurisdiction? We occasionally disregard their sovereignty
in the new world order;230 should we not likewise simply disregard, for
purposes of conflict of laws, their right to make and administer law
altogether? Or is it not rather liberating for small and weak states that they
need not constantly engage in jurispersuasion because their decisions are
prima facie granted recognition?
C. From Law to Power
From this view, a pluralist vision of conflict of laws may have exactly
the opposite effect from its ideal. Pluralism cannot avoid making a
distinction between communities with and communities without
jurisdiction, which in traditional conflict of laws is achieved through the
formal criterion of the “state.” It cannot protect non-state communities (and
arguably weak states) from having to convince powerful states of their
jurisdiction, so that their law will be enforced. Nor can it achieve a
universal criterion binding on states that will tell them in what situations

229. Berman does not distinguish both grounds of rejection. Berman, Globalization of
Jurisdiction, supra note 5 , at 511, 525-26 (“[A] cosmopolitan pluralist approach requires
that the enforcing court scrutinize the original judgment both for its assertion of community
dominion and for its substantive norms.”); Berman, Law and Globalization, supra note 5,
at 539.
230. See, e.g., Karime Bennoune, “Sovereignty vs. Suffering”? Re-examining
Sovereignty and Human Rights through the Lens of Iraq, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 243 (2002).
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they must recognize the jurisdiction of foreign communities, and when they
need not. This leaves jurispersuasion as the only relevant criterion. We can
hope that this will lead to more deliberation, but we must fear that it will
lead to an enhanced role for power and the selfish interest of communities.
The danger is that these matters rest in the hands of powerful actors, be
they states or other communities. It is the conflict of laws of powerful states
that determines who is in the club and who is not. For these states, conflict
of laws can become a tool of hegemony. For weaker states and non-state
communities alike, the need of jurispersuasion necessitates acceptance of
such power. The apotheosis of legal pluralism collapses back into crude
international relations realism in which each community determines what
is best for itself; and the strong states are not seriously constrained in
asserting their own jurisdiction, denying that of other communities,
whenever they want. When every community can, prima facie, equally
claim jurisdiction, jurisdiction no longer fulfills a filtering, distinguishing
function. Questions of conflict of laws become mere questions of politics
and power. The traditional concept of choice of law, with all its
shortcomings and inadequacies, has been able to function as a “gentle
civilizer of nations.”231 Whether the impact of a new choice of law based on
global legal pluralism will be more civilizing or less seems doubtful.
D. The Politics of Conflict of Laws
Compared to this, the traditional approach to conflict of laws, which
designates only state law to be the applicable law, suddenly looks attractive
again, both politically and rhetorically. If we cannot maintain this approach
in good faith because we realize that the monopolistic position of the state
has become untenable under conditions of globalization, then we need a
political theory to support the new choice of law. We will have to ask
whether the freedom that the law sets out to guarantee can be had without
the state. 232 We will have to ask whether there can be a meaningful system
of global governance that collapses neither into structures of empire or a
231. Cf. M ARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, T HE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: T HE RISE AND
FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 (2001).
232. See, e.g., William.E. Scheuerman, Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Rule of Law,
15 RATIO JURIS 439 (2002); Pierre Manent, Democracy Without Nations?, JOURNAL OF
DEMOCRACY (April 1997); Marc F. Plattner, Sovereignty and Democracy, 1 2 2 PO LICY
REVIEW 3 (Dec. 2003 - Jan. 2004); Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation and
the Future of Democracy, in JÜRGEN HABERMAS, T HE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION 58
(Max Pensky, ed. & trans., 2001); JEREMY A. RABKIN, LAW W I T H O U T NATIONS?: WHY
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES (2005); ALFRED C. AMAN
JR., T HE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: T AMING GLOBALIZATION T HROUGH LAW REFORM (2004).
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global state233 nor into an anarchical system in which, because all alleged
or real communities are formally equal, pure power rules. Overcoming the
regulatory state is a goal both of the radical left (e.g. Marxism), and the
radical right (e.g. libertarianism). If pluralist conflict of laws as a normative
proposal wants to steer a middle way, it will need a robust political theory
of global governance to back it up.
Developing such a theory would be one way forward. Another use of
insights from legal pluralism would be to abandon the claim that non-state
normative orders are law like state law while maintaining the call for their
recognition. Even in the debate within legal anthropology and sociology,
there is no agreement as to whether non-state legal orders must be seen and
treated as “law.” For example, Simon Roberts has recently voiced a warning
against “representing law without the state.”234 Others have been similarly
cautious about calling non-official law “law.”235 These authors are quite
unsuspicious of trying to preserve some kind of unjustified primacy of the
state over non-state actors. Rather, they fear that an extensive concept of
law is not helpful methodologically, both for the law and for anthropology.
As to the first claim, Roberts points out that “as radically different modes
of ordering and decision are represented together as ‘legal,’ law loses
analytic purchase.”236 As to the second claim, “negotiated orders have their
own rationalities.”237
Often, there is an ideological reason for the desire to raise non-state law
to the level of law, both on the left and on the right. On the left, proponents
point out that referring to non-state normative orders as something other
than law strips these orders of positive characteristics associated with the
term “law.”238 On the right, proponents of lex mercatoria are frequently also
proponents of free markets. For them, denying the state the monopoly over
law-making equates with denying the state its superior role in determining
adequate levels of regulation. Similarly, the invocation of an autonomous
law of the internet came hand in hand with a normative claim against
regulation and was rejected in no large part for this normative claim. The
use of terminology like “law” subtly suggests greater autonomy of
normative orders. This is why Richard Ford is so critical of such
233. M ARTI N SHAW , T HEORY OF THE GLOBAL STATE : GLOBALITY AS UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION (2000); M ICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE (2000).
234. Simon Roberts, After Government? On Representing Law Without the State, 68
M OD . L. REV. 1 (2005).
235. Tamanaha, supra note 109, at 192. For a defense of legal pluralism against
Tamanaha and especially Roberts, see von Benda-Beckmann, supra note 68, at 37-59.
236. Roberts, supra note 234, at 23; cf. Merry, supra note 75, at 878.
237. Merry, supra note 75, at 878. Roberts, supra note 234, at 23.
238. Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 28, at 369.
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“spatialization” of the internet: “Metaphysics of space threatens to derail
sound analysis and to smuggle in, as inevitable or logically compelled,
background rules that should be subject to debate,”239 including selfregulation. The new lex mercatoria, in its attempt to escape state regulation,
has been criticized from a political perspective. 240 On the left, legal
pluralists oppose the nationalism and ethnocentrism instilled in classical
conceptions of law. By limiting the notion of law to state law, legal
pluralists argue, we implant an intrinsic bias into our analyses, a bias for the
state, which in turn is a Western concept. Yet it may evidence an even
stronger bias to represent non-state legal orders as law. Doing so may well
conceal that the non-state communities want their normative orders to be
different from the law as it is known in the Western state. As long as our
concept of law is implicitly based on a Western state paradigm, transposing
this concept to non-state communities will not overcome the centrality of
the state, but rather will perpetuate it. The power of non-state norms may
lie in their otherness, in their character as non-law. This power is easily
reduced, these non-state orders are domesticated, once we reconceptualize
these norms as law.
Thus, it may well be that critic s fighting state-centrism and
ethnocentrism fall into an equally dangerous position: juricentrism. For
example, the new lex mercatoria was a product of international arbitration,
which presented itself as an alternative to, rather than a replication of, the
law. Arbitration was attractive precisely because the equitable rules
arbitrators applied were not the same as those applied by courts. In this
sense, raising non-state normative orders to the level of law may not meet
the interest of those who created those orders. “Law,” Roberts writes, “long
so garrulous about itself, is now, in its contemporary enlargement,
graciously embracing others in its discourse, seeking to tell those others
what they are.”241 We can link this back to the politics of recognition. If the
recognizing state, in order to recognize non-state normative orders as law,
must define them from the outside; if communities, in order to have their
239. Ford, supra note 43, at 177.
240. Brigitta Lurger, Der Pluralismus der “lex mercatoria,” 16 RECHTSHISTORISCHES
JOURNAL 705 (1997) (criticizing Teubner’s “global Bukowina”); CUTLER, supra note 55;
YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH , DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A T RANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, 311-17 (1996).
For a partial response, see Teubner, Breaking Frames, supra note 21, at 158-59; Karl-Heinz
Ladeur, Globalization and the Conversion of Democracy to Polycentric Networks: Can
Democracy Survive the End of the Nation State?, in PUBLIC GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION 89 (Karl-Heinz Ladeur ed., 2004).
241. Simon Roberts, Against Legal Pluralism: Some Reflections on the Contemporary
Enlargement of the Legal Domain, 42 J. OF LEG . PLURALISM 95, 98 (1998).
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normative orders recognized, must show them to be equivalent to the state’s
law, then recognition, “as law,” becomes the opposite of recognition—it
becomes a “violent appropriation.”242
V. CONCLUSION
Legal pluralism, does not translate into conflict of laws as easily as we
may think or wish. From the detached position of the sociologist and the
anthropologist, state and none-state orders may look similar. From the
position of the state that must distinguish for normative purposes between
law and non-law, this distinction becomes crucial because its abolition
would ultimately undermine the state itself. The same is true for the position
of none-state communities, which would undermine their own character as
non-states if the distinction was abolished.
This leaves us with a dilemma. We cannot go back to the illusion that
the state is the only relevant creator of norms in the world and so continue
choice of law as before. At the same time, the challenge of legal pluralism
for choice of law has far more dramatic implications than one might have
thought. A change in the nature of “applicable law” under choic e of law
rules goes hand-in-hand with a simultaneous change in the nature of not
only the non-state communities whose “law” should be applied, but also the
state whose choice of law rules designate the applicable law. In their desire
to counter the centrality of the state and to acknowledge the existence of
non-state legal orders, legal pluralists make us see more clearly the
centrality of the state for our thinking about law and choice of law. Conflict
of laws cannot solve the challenge from legal pluralism without also
questioning the role and nature of law.
Traditionally, the state is the blind spot of choice of law. Legal
pluralism succeeds in forcing us to focus on this blind spot and to turn its
central and monopolistic position from an unquestioned axiom to a
contingent observation in need of legitimation. Yet legal pluralists err if
they assume that our merely realizing the contingency of the state’s position
permits us to dispense with it. The world of conflict of laws is still based
strictly on the state to the extent that the state administers conflict of laws.
It follows that we should turn the questions asked by legal pluralists from
their heads to their feet. Instead of asking how globalization has changed
the role of the state in the world, we must ask how the state must change
itself in order to deal with globalization. Instead of asking how multiple
communities can replace or supplement the state, we must ask how the state
242. See Majid Yar, Recognition and the Politics of Human(e) Desire, 18 THEORY ,
CULTURE & SOCIETY 57 (2001).
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can accommodate multiple communities. Instead of asking how conflicts
can be avoided through privatization and depoliticization of private law, we
must ask how conflicts be resolved through a combination of public and
private interests.243 In short, instead of moving the state to the periphery of
our analyses and thereby denying its importance for our problems, we must
move it into the analytical center of our analysis so as to be able to critique
its role in globalization. To emancipate non-state law vis-à-vis the state, it
is not enough to change the status of non-state law within the state. We
must look as well at what is necessary on the side of the state to make such
emancipation possible; and we must ask what kind of emancipation this will
be.
The idea that since globalization brings about a plurality of legal orders
the state should recognize all these orders as law is either too radical or not
radical enough. It is too radical if it expects the state to do things that run
counter to what the state, as it exists right now, is about. The state will
always react as a state to the challenges of globalization, including
challenges from non-state communities and their laws. The idea is not
radical enough if it includes the belief that such a change could be brought
about without changing the character of the state. In order to overcome the
state-centered focus of conflict of laws, the state itself must be overcome.
Ultimately, acknowledging the prima facie jurisdiction of everyone to make
law goes hand-in-hand with acknowledging that no one has the
unquestioned jurisdiction to make law anymore. 244 If everyone is able to
claim jurisdiction, no one will have a superior position to mediate between
the norms conflicting of conflicting communities anymore, at least not from
a superior basis. Whether this is a desirable postmodern situation is not for
this article to answer. In any event, it is a far more radical consequence than
what a mere adaptation of conflict of laws norms to globalization would
otherwise suggest.

243. See Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory
Function of Private International Law in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J.
T RANSNAT’L . L. 209 (2002); Horatia M. Watt, Choice of Law in Integrated and
Interconnected Markets: A Matter of Political Economy, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 393 (2003).
244. Cf. Dane, supra note 120, at 992 (“If every social order that the state confronts is
a legal order, there is not legal order. If every legal thought is law, there is no law.”).

